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This paper examines the emergence of three new successful export activities in 
Argentina: biotechnology applied to human health, blueberries and chocolate 
confections. The main interest lies in ascertaining why these sectors/products 
were targeted, on which previously accumulated capabilities they were built upon, 
and what type of hurdles they faced and how they were overcome. In the absence 
of government support for discovery, these new exports emerged because the 
pioneers could introduce permanent or dynamic barriers to entry to compensate 
for the knowledge externalities they generated. When they could only introduce 
temporary barriers to entry, laissez faire investment in experimentation was sub-
optimally small. These new exports emerged in sectors where there were 
entrepreneurs with superior planning and networking skills and/or there were 
larger firms that could self-provide the required public goods and solve 
coordination failures by themselves.  
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Emergence of New Successful Export Activities in Latin America.” The authors thank, without implicating, Ernesto 
Stein, Andrés Rodríguez-Clare, Ricardo Hausmann, Eduardo Fernández-Arias and participants at the IDB 
Workshops on the Emergence of New Successful Export Activities in Latin America for their most useful comments 
and suggestions. María Laura Alzúa was a key contributor at the final stage of the project. We also benefited from 
the superb research assistance of Delfina Cavanagh and Eliana Miranda.   4
1. Introduction 
 
This paper studies the determinants of new successful export activities in Argentina in the past 
25 years with the goal of shedding light on the roles played by information and coordination 
externalities that make uncertain the ex-ante profitability of the new export, and on how these 
hurdles were overcome. It also seeks to determine the roles played by previously accumulated 
capabilities, industry-specific public goods and public policies in the emergence of these 
activities.  
Hausmann and Rodrik (2003, hereafter referred to as HR) show that developing new 
export activities may require sinking capital into experimentation to discover if the endeavor is 
profitable or not. Once such activities’ profitability is revealed, however, free entry into the 
activity erodes profits, thus preventing the pioneering entrepreneur from recouping 
experimentation costs, which would lead to sub-optimal investment in these activities under 
laissez faire. Additionally, the new activity may fail to be discovered because of coordination 
failures such as the lack of industry-specific public goods, which are not available because the 
activity that would demand them still does not exist. 
It is very important to learn how the coordination and information externalities were 
resolved and whether this resolution facilitated the growth of the new activities via an 
information revelation process and the development of industry-specific public goods for several 
reasons. First, insufficient investment due to information externalities may generate efficiency 
losses that are not visible because socially profitable activities fail to be developed. Second, 
Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2006) have found that greater export sophistication is associated 
with higher growth, and in turn this sophistication is facilitated by greater experimentation in the 
development of new export activities. Third, insufficient experimentation may lead to export 
concentration, which in turn has a negative effect on growth (see De Ferranti et al., 2002). 
Finally, widespread experimentation is needed to discover those activities with greater scope for 
catching-up to the world quality frontier (Hwang, 2006). 
Economic environments where experimentation is not facilitated (through targeted 
subsidies, carrots and sticks, direct government involvement, provision of industry-specific 
public goods and/or adequate export-facilitating policies and institutions) may lead to the   
emergence of new exports mostly in activities where the pioneer can introduce brand, technology 
or scale barriers to entry to compensate for the knowledge externality, which harm diffusion. In   5
sectors where the pioneer does not have this ability to subdue diffusion, a laissez faire scenario 
would lead to sub-optimal investment in learning about the new activities and/or to the complete 
absence of experimentation in some potentially profitable new activities.  
In this vein, our main interest lies in analyzing to what extent the self-discovery of local 
profitability for the new export activities creates knowledge externalities that lead to a large 
diffusion of these activities, à la HR, or whether these discoveries result from the exploitation of 
proprietary knowledge and/or the ability to introduce barriers to entry, with negative impact on 
diffusion. We are also concerned with the effects of the different drivers of discoveries for the 
accumulation of capabilities for subsequent structural transformation. 
While HR emphasize the need to discover local costs of production for new export 
activities, there may be other sources of uncertainty regarding the ex-ante profitability of these 
new activities. These uncertainties are related to discovering: a) position and slope of the foreign 
demand curve for differentiated goods, b) the costs of quality upgrading to meet technical and 
consumer requirements abroad, c) the best commercialization strategies and export product mix, 
d) how binding non-tariff barriers actually are, and e) whether the good can be locally produced 
at all through R&D activities. Even with adequate knowledge of local costs of production arising 
from long experience in producing the good under import substitution, newly exporting 
firms/sectors may face ex-ante substantial uncertainty regarding the profitability of exporting.  
We are concerned with these different types of uncertainty because their resolution will 
lead to different degrees of information revelation and will have different implications for the 
diffusion of new exports. For instance, when uncertainty is related to commercialization and 
foreign demand, export knowledge may diffuse across borders. In this setup, a pioneer may 
block domestic diffusion, but not foreign diffusion, which could further reduce the scope for 
local diffusion of the new exports (as foreign diffusion lowers export prices). In the case of 
uncertainty regarding the ability to produce the good at all, its resolution via R&D will probably 
generate proprietary knowledge and no diffusion, unless researchers move from one firm to 
another. 
We also seek to inquire into the possible presence of coordination failures (simultaneous 
development of upstream and downstream activities, simultaneous investment in production and 
in the required infrastructure, etc.) that may negatively affect the emergence and diffusion of new 
export activities, and how these failures are overcome.   6
The ultimate goal is to shed light on whether there is sub-optimal investment in 
discovering new export activities, and how efficient the emergence of new activities has been in 
the absence of government intervention. We are interested in understanding if fast and 
widespread diffusion is always desirable or if there are instances (especially in differentiated 
goods markets or in markets with scale economies and love for variety) where limited diffusion 
is advised. We also consider the relative importance of previously accumulated capabilities at the 
country, industry and firm levels in facilitating discovery and diffusion, as well as the   
capabilities created by new exports that may facilitate jumping to more sophisticated exports 
later on. 
We first provide a background on the trading environment in which the emergence of 
new exports occurred, analyzing the aggregate and sectoral behavior of traditional and new 
exports. We also evaluate the contributions of new exports to overall and sectoral export growth 
and to changes in the patterns of revealed comparative advantage, and their characteristics (factor 
intensity and scope for catching up to the world quality and price frontier). 
Next we develop a theoretical framework for analyzing the emergence of new export 
activities. The starting point for the theoretical thinking is HR’s model of local cost discovery, 
adapted to encompass the other types of uncertainties mentioned above. We allow for competing 
(or at times complementary) explanations for investing in new activities that arise from industrial 
organization models based on: a) brand development and sunk costs, b) technological or 
knowledge barriers to entry, and c) R&D or foreign technology adoption with technological or 
R&D spillovers. This theoretical framework generates testable predictions regarding the 
determinants of emergence of new export activities and their diffusion, and describes the 
different possible inefficiencies under laissez faire. 
Then we contrast the predictions arising from the theoretical framework with a case study 
analysis of the actual emergence of selected new exports in Argentina. The main tool for 
gathering the required information is conducting interviews with pioneers, imitators, industry 
associations and public officials involved in public policies that affected the new exports. We 
also use disaggregated secondary information on sectoral and firm-level trade data from the 
Customs Office. A key tool for accepting or rejecting hypotheses regarding the drivers of 
discovery and diffusion is the counterfactual analysis of sectors that shared some common   7
features with the new export activities and yet failed to take off and/or showed a different pattern 
of diffusion.  
The choice of case studies was based on the following considerations: a) negligible 
exports 25 years ago, b) fast export growth, c) reversal of revealed comparative disadvantage, d) 
current large volume and value of exports, e) degree of diffusion, f) relatively little intensity in 
the use of natural resources, g) preliminary appraisal of the degree of uncertainty involved in the 
discovery of these new activities. Based on these considerations we chose to study the following 
new export activities: blueberries, chocolate confections, and biotechnology applied to human 
health. The chosen counterfactuals, respectively, are fresh raspberries, sugar confections and 
biotechnology in Brazil.  
Section 2 and the Statistical Appendix provide an empirical evaluation of the trading 
environment for new exports, and of their contributions to structural transformation. Section 3 
presents the theoretical framework. Section 4 discusses the methodology for the empirical 
appraisal, via case study analysis, of the theoretical predictions regarding the determinants and 
impacts of the emergence of new export activities, and the choice of sectors to be studied. 
Sections 5 through 7 present the case studies and their lessons. Sections 8 and 9, respectively, 
present the development and policy implications that arise from the case studies. Section 10 
concludes. 
 
2. Trading Environment For New Exports and Contribution to Structural 
Transformation 
 
This section provides a background on the trading environment in which the emergence of new 
exports occurred, analyzing first the aggregate and sectoral behavior of volumes and values of 
traditional sectors. The section then evaluates the aggregate and sectoral performance of new 
exports, their contributions to overall and sectoral export growth and to changes in the patterns of 
revealed comparative advantage, and their characteristics (e.g., factor intensity and scope for 
catching up to the world quality and price frontier). The background statistical information and 
graphical and correlation analysis that support this appraisal are included in the Statistical 
Appendix.    8
2.1 Overall Export Behavior 
 
Argentine exports largely stagnated during the 1980s, were very dynamic during the 1990s (until 
1998), and have grown less than world trade since then. During 1993-2004 there was a 
significant increase in the share of natural resource based-exports in total exports, and these new 
external sales were largely associated with privatizations and deregulation.  
There was a lackluster evolution in unit export prices during the past 20 years, which 
suggests that only a handful of sectors showed improvement in the quality of their exports. 
Finally, during this period Argentina showed a deepening of revealed comparative advantage in 
agricultural goods, mining and oil, and also a deepening in revealed comparative disadvantage in 
machinery and equipment and in chemical products.  
Hence the overall trading environment was not very dynamic, especially regarding prices, 
and Argentina deepened its specialization in less modern activities. 
 
2.2 New Exports 
 
For the identification of new exports at the six-digit level of the Harmonized System (HS) 
between 1993-94 and 2003-04 we used the following criteria. Exports had to grow at least 300 
percent during this period (so as to include sectors with greater than average—154.7 percent—
and median—263 percent—export growth). They also had to register minimum average exports 
of US$10 million during 2003-04 and maximum average exports of US$1 million during 1993-
94. These criteria leave us with only 87 products that meet all our requirements (out of 4,198 
products at this level of disaggregation with positive exports in 2004).  
New exports represented a relatively small number of products, but rapidly increased 
their shares in total exports, generating a significant structural change in the composition of 
Argentina’s external sales. New exports represent 20.9 percent of the total value exported during 
2003-04 vis-à-vis 0.1 percent in 1993-94. These new exports grew significantly faster than their 
world counterparts, allowing them to increase nine-fold their share of world trade. However, this 
increase in participation was based on the expansion of quantities, as the prices of new exports 
tended to fall relative to the prices of world exports and of traditional exports in Argentina.  
The HS two-digit level sectors with the largest presence of newly exported products (5 
percent or more of the total number of six-digit level exported goods within each two-digit level 
sector) include activities directly linked to the exploitation of mining resources, industries that   9
process agricultural resources, industrial manufactures that process natural resources, and motor 
vehicles (a relatively labor-intensive activity that received an initial boost from Mercosur). On 
the other hand, there were very few or no newly exported products in “modern” activities such as 
Medical, Precision and Optical Instruments, Electronics, Electrical Machinery, and Computing 
Equipment.  
New exports contributed more than 20 percent of export growth in most two-digit level 
sectors, and 60 percent or more in five sectors. Sectoral export growth was greater in those 
activities where there emerged a larger number of newly exported products. However, most 
sectors experienced substantial intra-sectoral changes in the composition of their exports, even 
those where there were relatively few newly exported products. Nevertheless, in the sectors 
where new exports were more frequent, prices declined relative to those of traditional sectoral 
exports, while the opposite occurred in the sectors where discoveries were less frequent. This 
suggests that discoveries mostly did not target the most valuable opportunities. 
The emergence of newly exported products was more frequent in industries that are less 
labor-intensive, which is consistent with the greater frequency of new exports in natural resource 
based activities, which tend to be more capital intensive, and with the fact that capital was 
relatively cheap vis-à-vis labor during the 1990s.  
New exports did not appear to represent jumps between “trees” within sectors with 
revealed comparative advantage (RCA), but rather jumps to new sectors without RCA, as only 
29 percent of the six-digit level new exports were in two-digit sectors with RCA in 1993.
2 
Indeed, those two-digit level sectors that had a greater frequency of new exports ended up 
reversing revealed comparative disadvantages.  
This analysis suggests that, despite a significant structural change in the composition of 
exports, the discovery of valuable new exports in modern sectors appears to have been an 
exception rather than a rule. Hence the case study analysis of successful new exports of modern 
                                                 
2 Hidalgo et al. (2007) conceptualize the product space as a forest, goods as trees, and entrepreneurs as monkeys. 
Countries develop as monkeys jump from tree to tree. Trees further away are harder to jump to. Some parts of the 
forest are denser than others. Which trees monkeys are located on today determines where those monkeys will be 
tomorrow. With this analogy in mind, the process of growth involves moving from a poorer part of the forest, where 
trees have little fruit, to better parts of the forest.  This implies that monkeys will have to jump distances, that is, 
redeploy (human, physical and institutional) capital towards goods that are different from those currently under 
production.   10
goods will be helpful in identifying the main obstacles to structural transformation and 
determining how to remove them.  
 





A good starting point for analyzing these phenomena is HR’s model of self-discovery. In this 
model there is ex-ante uncertainty regarding local costs of production, and firms must sink 
capital into experimentation to find the actual costs. Once these costs are revealed, they become 
public knowledge. In such a set-up, no firm will experiment in discovery unless it expects it can 
enjoy at least temporary monopoly profits (or government subsidies). Otherwise, fast imitation 
will quickly lead to zero profits, making it unable to recoup the sunk costs of investment. If there 
are temporary “monopoly rights,” there will be investment in discovery, and all profitable new 
activities are exploited. Once the monopoly rights become void, free entry leads to specialization 
in the ex-post most profitable activity. In this framework, there is too little ex-ante investment 
and entrepreneurship (due to information externalities) and too much production diversification 
ex-post (due to temporary monopoly rights). 
 
3.1.1 Discovering Foreign Demand 
 
Uncertainty about foreign demand and positive externalities from enhanced reputation or country 
brand name (demand shifting) can play a key role in the emergence of new exports in semi-
industrialized economies. Demand uncertainty could involve learning about the right “price” 
(position and slope of demand curve) and commercialization strategies, and if it is profitable to 
meet this demand. Learning about the position of the demand curve can also entail learning about 
when the market is saturated.  
Vettas (2000) captures these features nicely. In his set-up, the pioneer reveals information 
on the extent of foreign demand, thus updating beliefs about the market saturation point, and 
subsequent entrants further enhance this knowledge. In Vettas’ set-up there is another externality 
as well: the current price depends positively on past sales (until the market saturation point is 
reached). In other words, enhanced reputation (or another demand-shifting effect) moves the 
demand curve to the right as exports grow.    11
Because of these two externalities, the competitive market equilibrium displays too little 
investment by the pioneer and overly slow diffusion at the beginning. Diffusion then speeds up 
because of the demand-shifting effect and eventually wanes as it approaches the revealed 
saturation point (representing an S-shaped or convex pattern of diffusion). In this competitive 
market equilibrium the pioneer would export only if it is profitable to do so, even with small 
initial demand. On the other hand, a social planner or a monopolist would internalize those 
externalities and invest even if initial sales were unprofitable, as long as the demand-shifting 
effect is large enough. What is more, they would want a very fast expansion of sales (a concave 
pattern of diffusion).  
 
3.1.2 Other Potential Uncertainties in the Self-Discovery Process 
 
Aside from local costs of production and foreign demand, developing new exports may also 
entail uncertainties regarding the following factors:  
•    Costs  of  quality  upgrading  to  meet technical and consumer requirements 
abroad.
3  
•     Costs of logistics. 
•     Best commercialization strategies and export product mix.  
•     The extent to which non-tariff barriers are actually binding (you may have to 
sink capital into specific export developments and ship them abroad in order 
to test how binding the restriction is).  
•     Finding  out  whether  the  good  can  be locally produced at all, via R&D 
activities. 
•     Best production techniques. Even if profits are known to be positive ex ante 
(because of very high export prices), it may pay to wait for others to sink 
capital in discovering the cheapest production technique. However, if the 
minimum expected profits are large enough, it may pay to start experimenting 
right away, raising the possibility that there may be more than one pioneer. 
                                                 
3  Case studies conducted in Sánchez and Butler (2005) reveal that there exist sizable uncertainties in the costs of 
complying with foreign standards and technical regulations.    12
 
3.1.3 Coordination Externalities 
 
The resolution of coordination externalities may also matter for the discovery of new successful 
export activities. This discovery often requires a simultaneous emergence of different stages of 
the production and commercialization process (intermediate inputs, final good, etc.) and of 
required infrastructure, both traditional (transportation, logistics, etc.) and sanitary and 
technological (testing, calibration and clinical analysis laboratories, etc.). Potentially profitable 
activities may fail to take off because of failure to coordinate by the private sector and/or the lack 
of public investment (or promotion of private investment) in key stages of the production and 
commercialization chain or in industry-specific public goods (like eradication of fruit plagues, 
irrigation, introduction of a regulatory framework, etc.). In this case we may observe an 
emergence of new export activities only when some of the required phases of the production and 
commercialization processes and industry-specific infrastructure were already present and 
engaged in related activities. 
The pioneer could be willing to overcome these coordination failures by herself, for 
instance through vertical integration, if the expected profits were large enough and she had 
enough resources to do so. However, this coordination failure is likely to affect the size of her 
initial investment. Additionally, the overcoming of coordination failures by the pioneer may at 
times introduce barriers to entry that hinder diffusion. On the other hand, there are instances 
where the pioneer may herself be “forced” to promote diffusion if she lacks the resources to 
attempt vertical integration (and there exist economies of scope and/or scale at different stages).  
 
3.1.4 Conditions for the Emergence of New Successful Export Activities 
 
The previous analysis suggests that in order to understand the actual process of emergence of 
successful new export activities we must allow the pioneer to capture monopoly rents through at 
least one of the following channels: 
 
•    Temporary monopoly rights, due to regulations or to the time it takes for the 
investments of imitators to mature (as in HR). 
•    Government subsidization of discovery (a corollary of HR).   13
•    Learning economies that allow the pioneer to jump faster than imitators to new 
temporary monopolies in more sophisticated products on the technological 
ladder. 
•      Ex-ante productivity advantage of pioneer (from prior knowledge or scale in 
related activities) that will persist even after the new activity has been 
discovered to be profitable. 
•     The ability of the pioneer to become a monopolist in upstream, midstream or 
downstream activities in the new export sector. 
•     Proprietary knowledge (information externalities are not too great). 
•     Pioneer may introduce barriers to entry (brand development, sunk costs, scale 
economies, technological barriers). 
•     These channels will have very different implications for diffusion. The first 
four may only delay it, the fifth may constrain it, and the last two may actually 
preclude it.  
 
3.1.5 Accumulated Capabilities and the Choice of New Export Activities 
 
Hausmann and Klinger (2006) find that countries’ abilities to jump to more sophisticated exports 
is largely conditioned by what these countries were previously exporting and the associated 
accumulated capabilities (human capital, industry-specific public goods, specialized input 
networks, commercialization channels). In our framework, greater cumulative capabilities would 
increase the expected profitability of some activities in comparison to others, making them a 
likelier target for experimentation and more natural candidates for success.  
A related issue is whether the accumulation of capabilities for some new exports occurs at 
an economy level, industry level (as in the case of industry-specific public goods) or firm level 
(as in the case of tacit knowledge, and what the implications of each case may be for the 
discovery and diffusion of new goods. For instance, intra-firm accumulated capabilities could 
foster increased experimentation (by yielding monopoly power based on proprietary knowledge), 
yet on the other hand they could introduce permanent barriers to entry that hinder diffusion. 
   14
3.1.6 Revealed Information and the Process of Diffusion 
 
The analysis made above also suggests that diffusion is more likely to occur when: 
•     Knowledge externalities are large and the pioneer cannot introduce barriers to 
entry.   
•     There exist agglomeration economies. 
•     Accumulation of capabilities occurs at an industry level.  
•     The  pioneer  has  an  incentive  to  promote diffusion at some stage of the 
production chain, in the expectation of capturing monopoly rents at other 
stages. 
•     Imitation  is  relatively  easy  (no  patents, information flows via suppliers of 
capital goods, thick labor market externalities). 
 
Additionally, the different types of uncertainty will lead to different degrees of 
information revelation, which will be transmitted through different channels and have different 
implications for the diffusion of new exports. For instance, when uncertainty is related to 
commercialization, foreign demand and product mix, export knowledge may diffuse across 
borders. In this set-up, a pioneer may be able to block domestic diffusion, but not foreign 
diffusion, which could further reduce the scope for local diffusion of new exports (as foreign 
diffusion lowers export prices). In the case of uncertainty regarding the ability to produce the 
good at all, its resolution via R&D will probably generate proprietary knowledge and no 
diffusion, unless researchers move from one firm to another. 
Vettas (2000) suggests that subsidizing infant exporting industries may be optimal in the 
presence of demand-revealing externalities. However, if there are cross-border externalities (in 
the revelation of demand saturation), foreign competitors may enter the market, diminishing the 
case for subsidies to discover these activities. In any case, export promotion might then require 
some strategic subsidies to deter foreign competitors from entering, and the welfare implications 
of such policies are not immediately obvious. 
   15
3.1.7 Welfare Analysis 
 
The inefficiencies that may be present in the actual process of emergence of new export activities 
will include those highlighted by HR (too little ex-ante investment, due to information 
externalities, and too much production diversification ex-post, due to temporary monopoly 
rights). Other possible inefficiencies suggested by our theoretical framework would be: a) biases 
in the choice of new exports towards activities that may not offer the highest social returns, but 
which may offer bigger possibilities of capturing rents by the pioneer (this is closely related to 
the second HR inefficiency), b) too little diffusion due to barriers to entry and to monopolistic 
behavior of the pioneer within the sectoral production and commercialization chain, c) too slow 
diffusion in the presence of demand revelation and demand shifting externalities, d) too much 
diffusion due to wrong expectations regarding the foreign demand saturation point.  
We must also add other sources of inefficiency that may hinder discovery and diffusion, 
such as: a) financing constraints, b) coordination failures, c) failures in the functioning of the 
national innovation system that reduce the effectiveness of individual innovative efforts.  
Finally, when appraising the social returns of the activities that are discovered we must 
also include the following considerations: a) accumulated capabilities in the new activities and 
the types of new exports that they will later allow to develop, b) rent shifting from foreign 
competitors. 
 
4. Case Study Analysis of the Emergence of New Export Activities in 
Argentina 
 
This section seeks to shed light on the drivers and the extent of the emergence of new export 
activities by analyzing a number of case studies for Argentina. The main goal is to identify the 
commonalities and differences in these processes, so as to help characterize the nature of the 
emergence of these new activities in Argentina. We also seek to identify the main inefficiencies 
that may be present in these processes.  
4.1 Criteria for Sector Selection 
We selected three new export activities to be analyzed: 
•     Chocolate confections 
•     Biotechnology applied to human health (BHH)   16
•     Blueberries 
 
All these cases present the following characteristics that make them attractive for the 
present study: a) negligible exports 20 years ago in the case of chocolates, and 15 years ago in 
the other cases; b) very fast export growth;  c) reversal of revealed comparative disadvantage in 
the case of chocolate confections; d) currently large volume and value of exports; e) large degree 
of diffusion in the case of blueberries, and little diffusion in the other two cases; f) relative little 
intensity in the use of natural resources in the cases of biotechnology and chocolates; g) entirely 
new production activities in the cases of blueberries and biotechnology; h) preliminary appraisal 
of a relatively large degree of uncertainty involved in the discovery of costs and/or foreign 
demand for these new activities; i) location in the periphery of the densest part of the product 
space estimated by Hausmann and Klinger (2006), i.e., they are candidates to generate an 
accumulation of capabilities that allow Argentina to jump to modern (high productivity) trees in 
the forest. The three sectors meet all the statistical criteria used to define a new export in Section 
2 and the Statistical Appendix. 
The three cases offer very interesting insights on how pioneers deal with information and 
coordination externalities when there are no government policies or investments that facilitate 
discovery, i.e., how they manage to generate temporary or permanent monopoly rents (through 
the introduction of barriers to entry, product-specific proprietary knowledge, and/or technical 
features that prevent a quick diffusion).   
In the case of chocolate confections there were several attractive features. The pioneer, 
and main exporter, has managed to become a global player in a world market that is dominated 
by large firms from rich countries. It is an interesting case of accumulation of capabilities at an 
intra-firm level (and also via the acquisition of other firms), of generation of information 
externalities regarding foreign demand and commercialization strategies, of demand shifting 
effects à la Vettas (2000), and of cross-border externalities. This case offers very interesting 
implications regarding when the discovery of new exports should be subsidized, and when 
diffusion is socially optimal or not (in this case there is the possibility that diffusion could be 
immiserizing). It is also a very interesting case because its monopoly position made the pioneer 
undertake socially optimal investments. This new export also helps shed light on the key role 
played by domestic firms in relation to branches of multinational corporations (MNCs) in the 
risky development of new exports. Finally, it is a very appealing case because the sector lacked a   17
natural comparative advantage (as it is intensive in the use of cocoa), and yet it managed to 
create a revealed comparative advantage through brand development and vertical product 
differentiation.  
Biotechnology applied to human health is also a very attractive case for several reasons. 
First, because Argentina managed to become an important exporter at an early stage of the world 
product cycle, ahead of all the countries with similar incomes and even ahead of many rich 
countries. Second, because the emergence of this sector was based on the exploitation of 
previously untapped accumulated research capabilities in life sciences, which had had no 
commercial use before, and was developed by national pharmaceutical laboratories that 
completely lacked experience in BHH. Third, the development of this sector involved two types 
of uncertainties. There was one generalized uncertainty regarding the suitability of local human 
capital for undertaking the required R&D to develop the new products, and a product-specific 
uncertainty that had to be resolved via R&D. Despite the relatively large information externality 
regarding the adequacy of local human capital, the pioneer managed to compensate for it with 
the proprietary nature of product-specific knowledge. Fourth, this new activity offers very 
important potential technological spillovers and large learning economies in R&D. Finally, BHH 
is representative of successes where timing is everything as a result of downward-sloping 
demands and experimentation taking place in many different countries. It is also an interesting 
case in which the pioneer has provided many public goods that have favored the newcomers, and 
where national firms were crucial for the development of the sector. 
The emergence of the blueberries export sector is also worth evaluating, as it is a case 
that fits very well the basic HR framework, although with some very interesting twists. The 
pioneer is an individual entrepreneur that faced ex-ante uncertainty regarding the profitability of 
the new activity, although less uncertainty than the industry average. He invested because of the 
expectation of temporary monopoly position until the investments of subsequent investors 
matured. However, he knew that newcomers would eventually erode his profits, which made him 
undertake a sub-optimal investment. It is very interesting that the pioneer nevertheless tried to 
gain a permanent monopoly position by specializing in the nursery and commercialization stages 
and promoting limited diffusion at the production stage. However, due to his sub-optimal level of 
experimentation (and limited financial resources) he promoted diffusion before the best 
production technologies were determined; this resulted in very low initial productivity levels   18
which were compensated by initially large prices. This poor technological transfer to farmers 
facilitated the entry of strong competitors at the nursery stage, which had started their research 
on plant cloning techniques at the same time that the pioneer started investing in production. The 
case is fascinating because the pioneer solved by himself coordination failures at different stages, 
even though his profits would be eroded by the competition. It is also very interesting because it 
appears to be a case of overshooting in diffusion, as prices remained high for too long due to the 
poor productivity of the original plantations, sending the wrong signal about long-run 
profitability. Finally, the case is attractive because Argentina succeeded in a market with 
downward-sloping demand, despite entering late. This was due to the fact that it managed, due to 
geographical traits, to become a monopolist in an underserved off-season market.  
The three cases thus offer variety in terms of the information and coordination 
externalities involved, the ways the pioneers dealt with them, the degree of diffusion and its 
optimal level, the roles of previously accumulated capabilities, and the optimal policies to 
promote new exports.  
 
4.2 Methodology for Case Study Analysis 
 
First, we used data from secondary sources (official trade statistics, websites, and publications) 
and from preliminary interviews to preliminarily identify: a) pioneers and the dynamics of 
diffusion, b) uncertainties involved, c) possible information externalities, d) possible sources of 
inefficiency, e) possible market and coordination failures, and f) contribution or interference of 
public policies. Then the proper case study analyses were undertaken. A standard questionnaire 
was designed and employed in all the case study interviews, based on the predictions of our 
theoretical framework and on the preliminary background information available. We interviewed 
pioneers, imitators, business associations, and the government agencies and officials involved.  
We then contrasted the predictions of our theoretical framework with the responses 
obtained in the interviews to determine, based on qualitative criteria, which of the predictions 
were more relevant for describing the actual processes of discovery and diffusion of new export 
activities and their welfare implications.  
In order to strengthen our case study findings we also performed counterfactual analyses. 
To this end we appraised cases involving sectors that share some common features with the new 
successful exports that we consider and yet failed to take off. The comparison of the features that   19
are not shared among these sectors helped us identify more accurately the key determinants of 
success—or lack thereof—in discovery and diffusion. 
In the case of blueberries, where there is discovery and sizable diffusion of its export as a 
fresh fruit, the counterfactual we chose is the production and exports of fresh raspberries, where 
the discovery was attempted but failed, despite sharing many market and technological 
characteristics with blueberries. This counterfactual analysis also involved a comparison with 
Chile’s success in discovering and diffusing exports of both types of berries. 
In the case of chocolate confections, where there has been little diffusion, the 
counterfactual analysis was based on sugar confections, another successful exporting sector. This 
older export activity, where diffusion has been more widespread, shares with chocolate 
confections some product attributes from the consumer’s point of view and  complementarities in 
commercialization. On the other hand, the sectors differ in that there exists a natural comparative 
advantage for sugar confections (though not for chocolates) and that product differentiation and 
brand barriers to entry are much less important in sugar confections.  
In the case of biotechnology applied to human health, we chose Brazil as a 
counterfactual. Despite a substantial government promotion effort, this country has not been as 
successful as Argentina in developing these exports. Brazil differs in terms of a much less 
significant presence and trajectory of national pharmaceutical laboratories than in Argentina 
(which developed the BHH sector) and in terms of its initial endowment of life science 
researchers. 
 
5. Case Study of Chocolate Confections 
 
5.1 Background Information 
 
Even though Argentina has a long tradition in the production of chocolates and chocolate 
confections under import substitution, exports are a relatively new activity.
4  
There are about 125 firms that manufacture chocolate products in Argentina, and 
production is moderately concentrated. Arcor, a family-owned Argentine firm, is the leading 
producer of chocolate confections in Argentina, followed by Georgalos, another family-owned 
                                                 
4  This product category encompasses all goods that have a minimum cocoa content. The products under analysis are 
those under the code 180690 of the MCM (HS-2002) classification, being described as “Other chocolates and other 
food products that contain cocoa,” which includes products with a chocolate covering.   20
Argentine company. Ferrero, an Italian-based multinational corporation, is the third producer and 
the largest exporter. Exports are more concentrated than production: Arcor and Ferrero represent 
98 percent of Argentine external sales of these goods.  
In the 1990s many multinational firms (Kraft-Suchard, Cadbury, Ferrero) located in 
Argentina, but most of them oriented their activities towards the domestic market, save for 
Ferrero, which was very export-oriented almost from the onset. Most multinationals entered 
through the purchase of domestic firms. There were also important Chilean investments in the 
sector. 
Exports started in the early 1980s, mostly in the form of non-differentiated products, and 
became significant in terms of volume and product differentiation only in the 1990s. This rapid 
export expansion involved sizable investment in production capacity, technological upgrading 
and market diversification. 
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Exports grew very significantly between 1992 and 2005, from US$9 million to US$72 
million (according to figures from national statistical agency INDEC), led by Arcor and Ferrero. 
In comparison, the value of world trade in chocolate confections doubled between 1990 and 
1998 (according to FAO data). Going further back in time, we observe that, according to 
COMTRADE data, these exports grew from US$456 thousand in 1980 to US$79.9 million in   21
2000, switching from a significant revealed comparative disadvantage in 1980 to a strong 
revealed comparative advantage in 2000.  
There are four large categories of products: chocolate tablets, chocolate confections, 
industrial chocolate, and bakery and chocolate fudge. All of them are locally produced despite 
the comparative disadvantage arising from the lack of local availability of cocoa, a result of  
tariff protection (Mercosur has a 23 percent common external tariff for these products) and the 
natural protection granted by logistics (mostly temperature management).  
Sustained export success was achieved only after the development of differentiated 
products that were adapted to local preferences in different markets, together with competitive 
prices. Previous attempts to export non-differentiated products, such as chocolate tablets, had not 
been successful and/or sustainable due to the fact that these goods are cocoa-intensive 
commodities, dominated by world leaders (Kraft, Hershey’s, Mars, Cadbury, Ferrero), which are 
usually vertically integrated (including the production of cocoa in African countries), have 
introduced brand barriers, dominate local preferences in different industrialized countries, and 
also frequently engage in dumping practices. Additionally, there is world excess capacity for the 
production of these goods.  
While export destinations were relatively concentrated in 1998 (44 percent to the United 
Kingdom, 38 percent to Brazil, 9 percent to Uruguay and 4 percent to Chile), in 2004 these 
exports reached more than 100 countries, including Mexico (20 percent), Brazil (16 percent), 
Chile (15 percent), the United States (7 percent) and Canada (7 percent). 
The export/output ratio for the whole chocolate confection sector in Argentina is 
currently around 10 percent. However, in the case of certain products made by the leading 
exporters this proportion can reach or even exceed 70 percent.  
Argentina’s exports of chocolate confections currently represent 1.2 percent of world 
exports of these goods (vis-à-vis Argentina’s 0.39 percent share of world trade in all goods). 
Argentina’s production of these goods represents 1.4 of world production. 
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5.2 Analysis of the Emergence of This Export Sector
5  
5.2.1  Who Was the Pioneer? Why Did It Target This New Activity? 
 
Arcor was the pioneer for exporting chocolate confections (differentiated products) on a large 
scale and to multiple markets in the early 1990s. This firm was also the first significant exporter 
among Latin American firms. It is not, however, the pioneer for production in Argentina. Aguila-
Saint had been the major manufacturer of chocolate products in Argentina since the 1880s but 
was acquired by Arcor in 1993.  
This firm was founded in 1951 and has been traditionally focused on the production and 
export of sugar confections (it is currently the world’s largest producer and exporter of these 
goods), in which Argentina enjoys a natural comparative advantage because of the relative 
abundance of sugar, milk and glucose. A global firm with several plants abroad (Brazil, Chile, 
Peru, Mexico), as well as commercial offices in many countries, Arcor exports to more than 100 
countries, with exclusive distributors in many of them. This international distribution system 
replicates its nationwide distribution system in Argentina, which was established in the early 
1980s. 
Its two main chocolate confection exports are Bon-O-Bon (BOB) and Rocklets. The BOB 
is a chocolate bonbon that was developed in the early 1980s as an imitation of a product already 
developed by Garoto in Brazil. Rocklets are candy-coated chocolates, similar to Mars’ M&Ms 
and Nestlé’s Smarties. The export/output ratios for these two goods exceed 60 percent. 
The key reason for targeting these exports arose from the need and opportunity to exploit 
scale economies in the commercialization of sugar confections through Arcor’s distributors 
abroad. Chocolate confections are natural complements of sweets and candies, as they are sold in 
the same stores and can be distributed by the same person/firm. This commercial 
complementarity was first exploited at the local level in the 1980s, and it was the main factor that 
motivated the production of differentiated chocolate confections by Arcor.  
                                                 
5  The analysis is based on interviews with Arcor executives (Guillermo Storni, Gerente de Negocios, División 
Chocolates; Marcelo Salcedo, Gerente de Investigación y Desarrollo, División Chocolates; Mariano Tamborini, 
Gerente de Exportaciones, División Golosinas), a former executive of Ferrero Argentina, Georgalos executives 
(Juan Miguel Georgalos, President), Cadbury Stani executives (Manuel González Campa, R&D Manager), Nestlé 
executives (written questionnaire to commercial department), and former government officials (Antonio Assefh, 
Undersecretary of Industry of Argentina, 1991-1996).   23
The choice of this new export activity was facilitated by prior production knowledge, 
under import substitution, of both chocolate tablets and differentiated chocolate confections 
(Arcor started producing chocolate tablets for the domestic market in the 1970s).  
Another factor that emerges as facilitating the choice of chocolate confections by Arcor is 
its ability to overcome, and in turn introduce, barriers to entry through brand development, scale 
and learning economies, sunk costs, bargaining power with suppliers and clients, and 
technological barriers. Arcor’s previous scale in the production, commercialization and export of 
sugar confections certainly helped in this regard.  
Hence commercial complementarity with sugar confections. coupled with Arcor’s 
network of distributors (which introduce fixed costs and demands a constant flow of sales), was 
the ultimate reason for targeting chocolate confections. 
It must also be highlighted that, in spite of being a pioneer in Argentina, Arcor has been 
an imitator at the world level. What Arcor does is to introduce some innovation to these 
products, particularly in terms of commercialization, distribution, and marketing. 
 
5.2.2  What Were the Main Ex-Ante Uncertainties Regarding the Profitability of Exports? How 
Were They Solved? What Was Discovered? Were There Any Surprises? 
 
Arcor’s exports of differentiated products faced significant uncertainties on the demand side. The 
firm needed to invest time and resources to discover foreign demand, profitable export product 
mixes, prices and quality ranges where it could compete, and optimal product presentation and 
sales strategy. These efforts revealed considerable valuable information on this front to both 
local and foreign competitors. Arcor did not face any significant uncertainty regarding costs of 
production and of complying with technical barriers to trade, nor did it face significant 
uncertainty regarding non-tariff barriers (NTBs).  
 
Production costs. Arcor’s previous experience in producing tablets for the domestic market, 
together with its expertise in sugar processing technology and its experienced cost and product 
development departments, helped reduce cost uncertainty significantly. Arcor also benefited 
from its existing relationships with suppliers of capital goods. Although Arcor did have to master 
technologies for flour (for the wafers in BOB), for differentiated chocolate products, and for 
temperature management, this learning did not involve sizable uncertainties. Arcor’s large 
bargaining power with suppliers, its vertical integration in many upstream activities (arising from   24
related activities in sweets and candies), its austerity, and its incorporation of the latest 
technologies also helped it to control costs.  
Arcor acquired further production know-how through the purchase of Aguila-Saint. The 
company obtained additional production knowledge from contract manufacturing relationships 
with world leaders, whereby the latter transmit knowledge for production a façon by Arcor. 
 
Demand and commercialization strategies. In order to be internationally competitive Argentine 
exporters of chocolate confections must offer differentiated goods that have a lower quality than 
the top world brands but higher quality than the rest, and that have a lower price than the world 
leaders. To this end Arcor had to make investments to determine which products worked in each 
market, as well as the right price, size and packaging.  In some cases it even had to create the 
market for new exporting goods, i.e., learn the position and slope of the demand curves for its 
products. 
Let us consider the case of BOB. The original product, created by Garoto in Brazil, was 
sold in boxes of assorted bonbons, together with other confections, and primarily targeted the 
Brazilian market. Arcor subsequently imitated this product and undertook innovations, replacing 
the Brazilian cashew nut paste filling with a peanut paste filling that is preferred elsewhere in 
Latin America. Other major commercial innovations further aided BOB sales in Latin America 
and the United States. Although BOB was first sold in a box of assorted bonbons, Arcor 
discovered that this confection sold especially well when packaged in a transparent plastic 
container including only BOB. Finally, Arcor learned that BOB could be sold very well as an 
individual product in a large number of countries, which allowed for mass production (Arcor 
currently manufactures 550 million units of BOB per year). Individual sales were particularly 
useful for capturing Latin American markets, where sweets, candies and chocolate confections 
are sold in small drugstores, as in Argentina.  
In the case of exports to the United States (a large BOB market), part of the demand 
uncertainty was transferred to local players via contract manufacturing with local firms (e.g., 
Wal-Mart). Uncertainty was additionally resolved by experimentation on the part of Arcor’s own 
distributors and commercial representatives. 
It must also be highlighted that BOB was a new product for world markets, and Arcor 
had to create a market for it. To this end it followed several complementary strategies: a) the use   25
of commercial persuasion by its distributors abroad, which already had significant clout with 
local drugstores and supermarkets through sales of sweets and candies; b) diffusion through 
international fairs; and c) the use of marketing whenever the product had some initial success.  
Another key issue is finding the “right” price for individual chocolate confections that are 
sold in drugstores (or similar venues). This price bears a relation to what is considered pocket 
change in each country (e.g., US$0.25 in the United States), particularly because of the nature of 
the consumption of these goods. They provide immediate gratification and often constitute an 
impulse purchase linked to the visual impact of packaging and advertising, and to spending no 
more than pocket change on them; the latter is especially relevant for children, who have limited 
budgets. Finding this right price entails some experimentation, followed by determining whether 
that price is profitable. For instance, in South Korea the right price is 100 won (US$ 0.10), a very 
low price that is pocket change in that country; a price of 150 won, however, is not pocket 
change.  In Australia, on the other hand, the equivalent of US$0.25 is pocket change, and there 
no other chocolate confections are sold at that price (or sweets and candies in general). 
In order to discover successful export products, Arcor had to undergo a trial and error 
process in different markets and engage in market creation efforts. This process became more 
efficient in the mid-1990s when the company began to focus on a small set of products after its 
success in exporting BOB and Rocklets. Up to that point there had been disagreement between 
distributors, who pushed for shipments of assorted goods that allowed risk diversification, and 
the new chocolate management, incorporated via the acquisition of Aguila, who had long 
understood the importance of focusing on the chocolate market.  
The selection of new products to experiment with usually arises from the following 
activities: a) participation in international fairs, which permits the discovery of new products  
developed elsewhere (and upon which an innovative imitation can be performed), along with  
exchanges with clients; b) exchanges with suppliers of capital goods, which suggest existing 
successful products that can be imitated, offering to convey the required equipment and 
production techniques; and c) the market knowledge of Arcor’s commercial representatives 
abroad. 
There were also important uncertainties regarding the markets where products could be 
profitably sold, as Arcor had to discover the prevailing commercialization system in each 
country (and if it suited Arcor’s products), its ability to deal with local temperatures (as   26
chocolate consumption decreases with heat), local preferences, and existing non-tariff barriers. 
Much of the market selection process (both for sugar and chocolate confections) is driven by 
constant participation in the main international confectionary fair (ISM) in Köln, Germany; since 
the beginning of that fair in 1974 Arcor has been an exhibitor.    
The geographical selection of markets was determined by a variety of factors. Factors 
such as climate, size, purchasing power and relatively low trade barriers created particular 
interest in the North American market (especially the states of California and Florida), where 
Arcor opened its first office in Miami in 1992. This market nonetheless presented important 
commercial uncertainties. For instance, Arcor experienced difficulties in finding an appropriate 
distribution channel, as there are only six or seven highly concentrated channels in North 
America (the company finally signed contracts with Wal-Mart). Arcor then gradually opened 
commercial offices in almost all of Latin America, which was closer in terms of language, 
preferences, packaging and freight costs. The company further explored and exploited a wide 
range of markets, as managers and directors spent substantial amounts of time in the Caribbean, 
Europe, and Africa, as well as in Israel and other countries, following up on contacts made at 
fairs and reinforcing initial sales. As overseas markets grew, Arcor opened a commercial office 
in Barcelona for Europe, Israel and Africa.  
 
5.2.3  Were There Any Coordination Externalities? How Were They Solved? 
 
Some of the required inputs were locally available as a result of their use in related food 
industries or because they could be directly sold in domestic and international markets 
(powdered milk, milk jelly, sugar, flour). Other inputs could be imported. Hence there were no 
potential coordination failures at the production stage that would have impeded the emergence of 
this sector. 
However, major macroeconomic disruptions during the 1980s led to recurrent shortages 
of critical inputs (packaging, glucose, aluminum foil, etc.). In order to develop this new export 
activity (which requires a strong market cultivation effort), Arcor therefore had to ensure reliable 
access to these inputs. Vertical integration was critical to this end and was facilitated by Arcor’s 
size and internal resources. Although local producers could have arisen for several of these 
inputs, they would not have been able to meet Arcor’s needs on a consistent basis.  Vertical 
integration in commercialization activities was also necessary, both in order to ensure larger   27
profit margins (thus permitting the absorption of macroeconomic shocks) and to learn about and 
cultivate foreign demand. Vertical integration in production and commercialization is typical of 
the largest world exporters of these goods. 
 
5.2.4  Why Was Investment in New Exports Successful? 
 
We can distinguish between the specific actions and strategies that the pioneer took to resolve 
the uncertainty and the characteristics of the pioneer that facilitated undertaking this risky 
investment. 
Most of the actions and strategies undertaken were discussed in the previous section. 
Among these strategies, we must highlight the role of product focus, which increases the 
probability of success in experimentation, by concentrating the firm’s efforts on discovering the 
demand and commercialization strategies for a relatively small number of products.  
Another important strategy involved undertaking innovative imitations of products with 
large commercial potential at early stages of their product cycle. Arcor focused on introducing 
commercial (and sometimes technological) innovations to products that have been proven to 
work in some countries and/or some market segments, and on creating new markets (sometimes 
global) for them or discovering demand for these goods in other market (quality and price) 
segments. This significantly reduced commercial uncertainty and helped increase the chances of 
success. In the case of BOB, Arcor improved upon the original Brazilian product in terms of 
commercialization strategies, export focus, and adaptation to local preferences. In the case of 
Rocklets, Arcor developed a product of good, but not premium, quality that could be sold more 
cheaply than M&Ms or Smarties. 
Arcor was additionally able to cross-subsidize experimentation in chocolate confections 
with established profitable activities (sugar confections). The external economies from being 
able to export chocolate confections together with sugar confections (exploiting the already 
established distribution network in many markets) also helped by reducing some of the certain 
costs of commercialization and by helping amortize the fixed costs involved in their trial and 
error process. Accumulated capabilities in the commercialization of sugar confections were a key 
factor. Indeed, the product space analysis of Hausmann and Klinger (2006) places these two 
goods next to one another.    28
Arcor’s commitment to exporting, even if uncertain of the final profits, was also a major 
facilitating factor which sets it apart from local branches of multinational companies and from 
other local firms. Finally, all the traits of Arcor that helped reduce the costs of production 
(discussed in a previous section) also facilitated experimentation by moving the probability 
distribution of profits to the right.  
 
5.2.5  What Was Done to Consolidate the New Export Success and Preserve Monopoly Rents?  
 
Two types of actions for consolidating export success must be considered. First, those related to 
product attributes and choice of production technologies that affect the ability to sustain exports 
and to cultivate markets over time. Second, those related to preserving, and capturing, market 
shares from local and foreign competitors that target the same market and product segments.  
The ability to sustain exports and to cultivate markets over time is very important for 
chocolate confections. This helps to: a) build a reputation for reliability among clients, b) 
establish brand names, c) exploit learning economies in production (that allow for quality 
improvements and/or facilitate new developments), d) develop long-term relationships with 
suppliers of specialized inputs, and e) be better prepared to comply with product and process 
norms and technical regulations, and to adapt products and packaging to local preferences. In the 
case of Arcor, sustaining exports has helped to amortize the fixed costs associated with having its 
own network of commercial offices and distributors. In the case of chocolate confections, this 
ability can be negatively affected by macroeconomic shocks that have a sizable negative impact 
on unit costs of production and on profitability, as it is not possible to pass through these cost 
changes to foreign consumers (exports of these differentiated products involve pricing-to-
market), and that introduce large uncertainty regarding the availability of critical inputs. 
Arcor dealt with these threats by adding value through product differentiation, quality 
development, marketing and branding, which helped reduce the impact of labor costs on prices 
(the average export price of chocolate products is US$5 per kilo, while the average price of 
exports of sugar confections, where there is much less product differentiation and branding, is 
lower than US$1 per kilo). The company also opted for upstream and downstream vertical 
integration, which allows it to increase profit margins and to better absorb negative cost shocks. 
Investment in the most advanced technology, which substantially increased productivity and 
quality, and reduced production costs, also helped in this regard. According to the Arcor   29
executives interviewed for this study, a true export success involves brand development and 
installation, and significant marketing activities, i.e., minimizing the random component of 
market penetration.  
All these actions and strategies also introduce barriers to entry to competitors in the form 
of brand barriers, sunk costs, scale economies and technological barriers. 
  
5.2.6  What Impact (Actual and Potential) Did the New Exports Have on the Pioneer and on the 
Sector (Knowledge and Other Spillovers)? 
 
This discovery generated knowledge externalities about the profitability of exporting chocolate 
confections from Argentina. It also produced public goods (reputation for Argentine exports). 
Finally, it generated production learning and demanded product and process certifications that 
are then passed on to input suppliers and to other producers. Other Argentine firms in the sector 
were not be able to benefit significantly from these impacts for reasons related directly to the 
pioneer’s actions, to market imperfections and to those firms’ current productivities/scales of 
productions.  
 
Information revelation. Arcor revealed important information, especially about demand 
(products and markets) and commercialization strategies that work best. Let us recall, for 
instance, that the company discovered the (ex-ante uncertain) advantages of selling bonbons on a 
per unit basis, or that it created a regional and global market for BOB. It also revealed the 
advantages of undertaking innovative imitation. Other local producers did not take advantage of 
this useful information. Instead there are foreign producers, some in South America and others in 
China, that have used this revealed information to try to compete with Arcor in some of its 
products and markets, though with only partial success.  
Arcor did not reveal much technical information about production or product and quality 
development. This firm usually designs its own production lines, so as to avoid the transmission 
of technological knowledge to others via suppliers of capital goods, and there has not been a 
flow of technical personnel from Arcor to other firms.  Nevertheless, revealing such information 
would not represent a significant knowledge externality, as much of this knowledge is available 
from suppliers of capital goods, multinational clients (via contract manufacturing) and the access 
to technical training of European experts.  
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Arcor’s learning-by-doing and productivity improvements and their spillovers.  Exports of 
chocolate confections resulted in significant productivity gains for Arcor. The demands of 
certification (ISO 9001, HACCP and GMP) of products and processes and of quality 
improvements from foreign customers (from the United States, Europe and the Middle East) 
forced the company to introduce significant improvements in products and processes in all of its 
plants, leading to great productivity improvements. Additionally, all the new investments geared 
to expanding production capacity involved equipment with the latest technology, consistent with 
the foreign demand for quality. The demands of certifications and compliance with norms for 
contract manufacturing with large firms (Wal-Mart, Nestlé in Brazil, and Brach in the United 
States for sugar confections) are usually more stringent, as the latter face stringent demands of 
quality, in accordance with their brands and prestige in the market. Some of these productivity 
and quality gains spilled over to Arcor’s suppliers of specialized inputs, but lack of export 
diffusion has allowed Arcor to capture most of these rents. 
There were also internal spillovers from successful chocolate confections to the 
development of new sugar confections within Arcor, which appear not to have spilled over to 
other producers/exporters of sweets and candies in Argentina. For instance, inspired by BOB, 
Arcor has developed a bubble gum with juicy filling, which is an imitation of the Bubbaloo made 
by Cadbury-Adams. Arcor innovated on the original product by changing the coating and the 
shape. This product, which is an export success for Arcor-Brazil, required three years of 
development, and the company is still experimenting with new markets. 
 
Development of specialized network of suppliers. Arcor relies on external suppliers for milk, 
milk jelly, cocoa, peanuts and aluminum and flexible wrappings. The demands for Arcor’s 
certifications by foreign customers have a cascade effect on Arcor’s suppliers, as they have to 
accommodate their processes and products to the same quality standards that are demanded of 
Arcor, complying with the same norms and technical regulations. Arcor is deeply involved in the 
development of suppliers, demanding certifications, evaluating and providing technical 
assistance to suppliers, and taking advantage of the expertise obtained from auditors sent by 
clients from the US and Europe. This interaction has generated an implicit long-term contract 
between Arcor and its suppliers, who tend to work exclusively with this firm. Hence the quality 
improvements in this area do not spill over to other chocolate producers. Indeed there appears to   31
be an important idiosyncratic component in the relations of chocolate producers with suppliers of 
specialized inputs (lack of export diffusion does not contribute, either). For instance, Ferrero 
Argentina (the other largest exporter) had to undergo a prolonged process of search and 
negotiations with large local producers until they could secure continuous and reliable access to 
some inputs, such as milk, of the required quality. Georgalos has also stressed the importance of 
persistence of exports so as to develop long-term relations with suppliers, paying for the latter’s 
investment in the development and production of specific ingredients.  
There are additional spillovers, although not always to local producers, in the area of 
peanuts. Arcor is devoting substantial effort to the development of peanut suppliers; many of 
them already are very advanced in terms of certifications and are exporting a great deal. One 
producer, for instance, supplies peanuts of similar characteristics to Mars for M&Ms and to 
Arcor for Rocklets.  
 
Reputation. The development of these new exports of good and reliable quality by the pioneer, 
and their persistence over time have helped build a good reputation for Argentine producers of 
chocolate confections as being able to reliably supply differentiated goods with an adequate 
combination of price and quality. In the past Argentine producers were viewed mostly as an 
alternate source of low prices for products with little differentiation. This is a public good 
generated by Arcor which has been taken advantage of by other Argentine exporters only to a 
very small extent.  
 
5.2.7 Was There Diffusion of this Export Activity? What Were the Key Drivers   
of this Diffusion (or Lack Thereof)? 
 
Extent of diffusion among firms located in Argentina. There has been almost no diffusion of the 
discovery of exports of differentiated chocolate confections among Argentine firms (see Table 
1). The only other Argentine firms included among the top ten exporters are Georgalos and 
Felfort, which export very little. There emerged only one other major exporter, Ferrero 
Argentina, the local branch of Ferrero International (a global firm with headquarters in Italy). 
The other local branches of multinational firms are very minor exporters. This last group 
includes Cadbury-Stani and Kraft Foods (Nestlé does not produce chocolates in Argentina). As a 
result, Arcor (which owns Estirenos as well) and Ferrero represent 97 percent of all exports. 
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Table 1. Other Chocolate and Other Food Preparations Containing Cocoa, Code 180690, 
Share (percentage) 
 
Enterprises 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Arcor S.A.I.C. 78.15 75.47 77.78 49.39 49.74 35.39 28.90 34.54 42.75 40.20 39.42 37.58
Cadbury Stani SAIC. 0.00 0.13 1.38 1.29 0.70 3.07 0.82 1.76 1.34 1.18 1.75 1.52
Chocolates Bariloche S.A.I.C. 0.47 0.44 0.11 0.53 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Estirenos S.A. 2.10 4.95 3.08 1.72 4.81 8.55 15.73 14.32 6.73 8.73 9.23 9.00
Ferrero Arg. S.A. 3.07 0.21 8.48 43.37 42.19 50.42 52.57 47.34 47.99 47.55 47.90 49.73
Georgalos Hnos.S.A.I.C.A. 1.81 1.96 0.97 1.25 0.91 0.96 0.79 0.02 0.04 0.18 0.14 0.24
Kraft Foods Arg. S.A. 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.11 0.13 0.01 0.12 0.11 0.07
La Delicia Felipe Fort S.A.I.CY F 0.08 0.00 0.36 0.45 0.22 0.19 0.13 0.16 0.22 1.20 0.35 0.16
Vealfe S.A. 9.61 12.55 2.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Nestle Arg. S.A. 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.40 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Others 3.88 4.25 4.92 1.99 0.96 1.10 0.87 1.72 0.90 0.85 1.09 1.69
Total exported (US$) 14,365,962           32,673,966           40,800,223           67,062,129           85,737,650           63,421,344           67,779,246           65,713,571           52,703,665           50,998,644           64,988,924           72,772,767            
Total firms: 197. Selected firms: 10 largest exporters. 
Source: IERAL from Fundación Mediterránea based on Aduana Argentina. 
 
Production geared towards import substitution is more diffused among local firms, under 
the umbrella of Mercosur’s common external tariff (23 percent) and the logistical complications 
of chocolate exports. Georgalos is the second largest manufacturer of chocolate tablets, industrial 
chocolates, and chocolate confections in Argentina, and Felfort is another important player in the 
local market. These firms have been either unable or unwilling to take advantage of any 
knowledge spillovers and public goods generated by Arcor.  
Ferrero set up a new plant (greenfield investment) in 1996, which specialized in the 
production and export of hollow chocolate eggs with toys inside (the Kinder Sorpresa) that was 
intended both for the local and the global markets from the onset. Other multinationals invested 
in Argentina mostly with import substitution in mind. 
While there has not been a diffusion process of exports towards local competitors, it can 
be argued that diffusion occurred in the form of Arcor purchasing its potential competitors before 
they replicated its scale and strategies. For instance, Arcor acquired Aguila-Saint, the local leader 
in the production of chocolates, and Dos En Uno, the Chilean leader.  
 
Regional and global diffusion. Brazilian firms, which benefit from the local availability of cocoa, 
traditionally emphasized their large domestic market, where they sold chocolate tablets and 
bonbons in assorted boxes. This did not change initially after the big acquisitions by 
multinational firms (Kraft purchased Lacta; Nestlé also has a strong presence in Brazil, both with 
its own brand and with its purchase of Garoto). However, Kraft-Lacta and Nestlé-Garoto in 
Brazil are currently taking advantage of Arcor’s insufficient production capacity for BOB to 
supply part of the growing demand for this type of product in Latin America, using similar sales 
strategies (sold in units as individual products) and flavor adaptations as Arcor. Kraft-Lacta is   33
exporting a product very similar to BOB under the “Gallito” brand (a leading brand in Central 
America) and Nestlé is exporting the Garoto original version of BOB. These firms are certainly 
trying to take advantage of Arcor’s revealed information. The Chilean firm Dos En Uno, before 
being acquired by Arcor in 1997, was considered to be a small replica of Arcor, with a 
significant commitment to exporting, a strong presence in Latin American markets, somewhat 
similar commercialization strategies, and focus on a lower quality and price segment, although 
with brand development (like the Nicolo, a value-for-price product that was, and continues to be, 
highly successful in markets like Mexico). Other regional producers such as Chile’s Costa-
Carozzi and Colombia’s Compañía General de Chocolates are trying to compete with Arcor in 
Latin American markets with similar commercial strategies, but with little success so far.  It must 
again be stressed that Arcor was a pioneer in exporting to (and designing specific products for) 
Latin America on a large scale. Chinese firms are currently trying to imitate BOB and to 
compete on the basis of price.   
There thus appears to occur an interesting global export diffusion process from world 
leaders to Arcor (which performs innovative imitation upon their products), and limited regional 
diffusion from Arcor to firms (either local or subsidiaries of multinationals) in neighboring 
countries, with essentially no diffusion to Argentina. 
 
Determinants of extent of diffusion among locals. International markets for the chocolate 
confections discussed above are characterized by major sunk costs and technological, scale, 
capacity, and brand barriers, introduced both by international firms and by Arcor. Hence the lack 
of export diffusion among locals appears to reflect the fact that the knowledge externalities and 
public goods (reputation) provided by Arcor were not large enough to surmount the barriers to 
entry.  
Arcor introduced several of these barriers in the 1980s, anticipating possible diffusion. To 
give one example, Arcor executives explicitly stated: “In the 1980s the need to generate 
differentiated products that involve an investment with scale and technology barriers was 
recognized. This led to the development of BOB and Butter Toffee [a filled candy], which could 
not be easily reproduced.” Arcor additionally made major investments in the latest technology   34
and in vertical integration during the 1980s.
6 This was tremendously costly during crises such as 
the 1989 hyper-inflation. In the 1990s, however, Arcor was 10 to 5 years ahead of its 
competition. The company permanently reinvests profits in order to maintain these barriers, and 
Arcor’s distribution system presents another important barrier. 
These factors make it extremely difficult for small local firms lacking a minimum scale to 
make use of Arcor’s commercial spillovers. For instance, while Arcor has 300 people devoted to 
international commercialization alone, Georgalos, the second largest producer, has a total 
number of 600 employees. Credit constraints do not help, either. Faced with such barriers, local 
firms prefer to focus on the domestic market, operate less modern technologies on a smaller 
scale, and make marginal exports to neighboring countries (and sometimes to more distant 
countries such as South Africa and Mexico); they do not make any significant investment in 
products specifically developed for foreign markets. Some of them, like Georgalos and Felfort, 
are experimenting with niches not targeted by the sectoral leaders, like sugarless chocolates, 
which are expensive to develop and to produce (because of the need to find palatable artificially 
sweetened chocolates and the high cost of artificial sweeteners), but they do not face brand 
barriers. Not only did barriers to entry matter, but also the fact that only Arcor appeared to have 
accumulated capabilities for commercialization in international markets through its experience in 
the sugar confections industry, and that these capabilities did not spill over to other firms.  
The case of lack of diffusion among multinationals operating in Argentina (except for 
Ferrero) is interesting, because they would not be as constrained by barriers to entry as local 
producers. Interviews with executives from some of these companies revealed that local 
branches are usually constrained to export only products that are currently profitable, i.e., they 
cannot decide by themselves to invest in market cultivation. They also consider it very difficult 
to achieve cost competitiveness in exporting from Argentina, due to the lack of cocoa and to 
logistical difficulties. As such, they concentrate on import substitution and intra-firm trade 
whenever they can be cost-competitive vis-à-vis other branches in different countries. The two 
biggest foreign investments in the chocolate sector were made by Cadbury and by Ferrero.  
                                                 
6  Arcor set top-of-the-line production facilities for chocolate confections, particularly the BOB, in 1982, and then 
new top-of-the-line production facilities and technologies in 1995. Both plants and production lines were the most 
advanced technology for Latin America at both times, and less labor-intensive than the major competitor in Brazil 
(Garoto), which helped Arcor to significantly reduce costs as long as it produced on a large scale.   35
Cadbury entered Argentina through the purchase of Stani, a local manufacturer of 
chewing gum, and then decided to invest a in a top-of-the-line technology for chocolates (with 
the same quality as in England) in 1995, both because that is their core business and because 
there was at the time a willingness and capacity to pay for expensive chocolate tablets in 
Argentina. However, company officials now believe that they should have invested in a less 
advanced and more versatile technology aimed at producing less expensive chocolates more 
suitable for the domestic and regional market. Cadbury currently exports only to Chile and 
Uruguay, and makes sporadic intra-firm exports.  
Ferrero discovered the Argentine market through a distribution contract in 1993-94 with 
Terrabusi, a local producer of confectionary products, for the import of Ferrero products. Under 
this scheme Ferrero’s sales jumped from US$4 million to US$70 million in a short period of 
time, which prompted the company to set up a plant in 1996 to produce for the domestic and 
world markets. This plant specializes in the production of Kinder Surprise (KS). The decision to 
set up this plant in Argentina rather than in Brazil was based on the favorable regulatory 
environment at the time, as well as local ability and willingness to pay for those high-end 
chocolate confections, Mercosur’s high common external tariff, and Ferrero’s need to install an 
additional KS plant from which to serve global markets (the other KS plants are located in 
Germany, Belgium, Poland and Italy). An additional key factor was Ferrero’s expectation of 
benefiting from the “Ley de Especialización Industrial,” which favored specialization in the 
export of a narrow range of goods by giving extra export drawbacks and allowing firms to import 
other products, in a certain proportion to the increase in exports, at very low tariffs (2 percent). 
Arcor successfully lobbied against the granting of these benefits to Ferrero on the grounds that 
the latter did not have a previous production and export history in Argentina and hence did not 
have incremental exports. Ferrero’s investments made it the only other major exporter from 
Argentina, especially after the domestic market significantly contracted after 1998. However, 
company officials believe that this is not a sustainable endeavor and that they should have aimed 
for a multi-product plant of smaller scale, oriented to the domestic market and Mercosur.  
 
Determinants of the extent of regional diffusion. As mentioned above, some Brazilian branches 
of multinationals are trying to imitate BOB and compete with this type of product in Latin 
American markets. This differs from the behavior of MNCs operating in Argentina and appears   36
to reflect their greater economies of scale and accumulated capabilities (from operating in the 
large Brazilian market), which make it easier to try to overcome the entry barriers imposed by 
Arcor. The local availability of cocoa probably helps as well. The knowledge externality 
generated by Arcor very likely made these exports profitable enough to be approved by those 
companies’ headquarters.  
However, the evidence collected here suggests that these attempts have been made 
possible only because of Arcor’s temporary capacity constraints, which relaxed one very 
important barrier to entry. Arcor’s reaction has been to make substantial new top-of-the-line-
technology capacity investments to defend the BOB brand. Another strategy used to block 
regional diffusion has been to target marketing to children through the purchase of international 
licenses for stickers of characters like Superman or Pokemon that are attached to the packaging. 
Arcor does so because it considers that other firms can commit only to exporting to regional 
markets and, lacking Arcor’s scale, cannot compete on price and cost at a global level.   
 
Counterfactual analysis of lack of diffusion. A counterfactual comparison with the exports of 
sugar confections helps shed further light on the determinants of the lack of diffusion of 
chocolate confection exports. Arcor first targeted sugar confections because Argentina had a 
natural comparative advantage for its production and because there were no significant brand 
barriers to entry, i.e., there was less need to differentiate products and to invest in demand 
discovery. Sugar and chocolate confections are horizontally related both through sharing similar 
consumer targets, commercialization venues and several inputs, which makes them natural 
complements. However, the latter compete in a market with more brand barriers and product 
differentiation, and Argentina does not enjoy a natural comparative advantage in their 
production.    37
Table 2. Exports of Sugar Confections by Percentage Share 
 
Enterprises 2004 2005 2006
ARCOR S.A.I.C. 75.5 73.0 68.1
ESTIRENOS S.A. 10.1 9.7 10.0
CANDY SOCIEDAD ANONIMA 0.1 2.5 5.9
CADBURY STANI SAIC. 3.3 4.7 5.5
ALICA SOCIEDAD ANONIMA 3.5 2.5 2.7
PRODUCTOS LIPO SOCIEDAD ANONIMA 2.9 2.6 2.4
BONAFIDE GOLOSINAS S.A. 1.6 1.4 1.6
LHERITIER ARGENTINA S.A. 1.1 1.0 1.1
CHOCOLATES LACASA ARGENTINA S.A. 0.3 0.4 0.5
FERRERO ARGENTINA S.A. 0.2 0.2 0.4
OTHERS 1.4 2.0 1.8
Total exported (US$) 75,739,983       76,402,290       60,246,607          
 
Total firms: 75. Selected firms: 10. 
Source: IERAL from Fundación Mediterránea based on Aduana Argentina. 
 
 
As expected, there is greater diffusion in exports of sugar confections. While Arcor 
represents 78 percent of foreign sales in this category, there are six other firms (five domestic 
and one multinational) with exports that exceed US$1 million and which represent 19.25 percent 
of sales (see Table 2). In contrast, there are only three firms that export more than US$1 million 
in the chocolate confection sector, and two of them are multinationals that are engaged mostly in 
intra-firm trade.  A comparison of the export history of the sugar and chocolate confections 
sectors would suggest that the lack of natural comparative advantage and the existence of 
important brand barriers and product differentiation in the chocolate confection industry have 
prevented diffusion the most. 
 
5.2.8   Roles of Previously Accumulated Capabilities, Industry-Specific Public Goods and Public 
Policies 
 
The discovery of chocolate confections was built upon the capabilities accumulated in the 
production and commercialization of chocolate tablets and confections for the local market under 
import substitution and the capabilities accumulated in the commercialization of sugar 
confections, and on the cost advantages granted by economies of scale in the latter activity. 
Arcor further benefited strongly from the capabilities for the production of chocolate tablets and 
confections accumulated by Aguila-Saint upon acquiring this firm.  
Looking at HK’s product space, we can observe that the probability of exporting 
chocolate confections is also positively associated with the exports of products where Argentina   38
has a natural comparative advantage, such as margarine, bakery products, cheese and curd and 
oil seeds, and in which Argentina had accumulated production and export capabilities.  
It is interesting to note that all the accumulated capabilities coalesced into a single firm 
(both through Arcor’s own accumulated capabilities and through the acquisition of other firms). 
This is consistent with a world market structure where there exists one or at most two major 
producers and exporters per country (Mars and Hershey’s in the US, Ferrero in Italy, Lindt in 
Switzerland, Cadbury in Germany, etc.), and where branding, scale and sunk costs are barriers to 
entry to most markets. 
Some of the industry-specific public goods (food safety agency, basic logistics for food 
industry, skilled personnel) were already in place because of Argentina’s tradition in the 
production and export of related foodstuffs. Other industry-specific public goods (laboratories, 
access to reliable packaging supply) were internally provided by Arcor, which fully internalized 
the benefits of having access to them.  
There was no significant government intervention in the emergence of this new export 
activity. Industrial promotion regimes influenced the location of some production plants but were 
not necessary for their success. Arcor avers that one distinctive feature of Argentina is that it 
does not grant special support for international competition to large global firms such as itself, 
the opposite of Brazil’s policy. 
 
5.3 Welfare Analysis 
 
In this case it does not appear that ex-ante investment in discovery was too small due to 
information externalities. Instead, Arcor’s ability to introduce barriers to entry allowed it to 
capture discovery rents. 
It is hard to argue that too little diffusion is inefficient in this case. First because these are 
differentiated products with downward-sloping demands, and it is not clear if Argentine 
newcomers that sank capital into brand development and other activities would be stealing 
profits from foreign competitors or from Arcor. The fact that Arcor’s future export growth 
appears to be tied to the opening of new markets rather than expanding sales in its current 
markets (stealing demand from foreign competitors) suggests that diffusion could even be 
“immiserizing” by duplicating sunk costs and splitting demand among a larger number of 
Argentinean exporters. We must add that export expansion does not appear to generate   39
technological spillovers and other spillovers in the form of the development of specialized input 
markets. In this vein, Arcor’s could be introducing “barriers to the poor” rather than “barriers to 
riches.” 
This case study fits nicely into the Vettas (2000) framework for analyzing discovery and 
diffusion of new exports when there are demand-related information externalities and demand- 
shifting effects. Arcor acted as a monopolist replicating the investment of a social planner, 
speeding up export growth at the beginning (to take advantage of demand-shifting reputation 
effects) and then slowing down as it learned that the saturation points became near (see Figure 
2). Indeed, Arcor claims that their markets are currently saturated and that the only way for their 
exports to grow is by opening new markets or by developing new export products. 
 

























Source: IERAL from Fundación Mediterránea based on INDEC. 
 
This is also a case where the pioneer appears to face unusually small demand uncertainty 
(because of its commercialization capabilities accumulated in sugar confections) and an 
unusually high ability to overcome coordination failures by itself. These traits make initial sales 
more profitable in expected terms (and less uncertain) than for other local competitors, 
prompting it to make big investments. As a result there would potentially be large information 
and coordination externalities, which fail to materialize because of the introduction of barriers to 
entry. 
It is interesting to note that in this case monopoly substitutes for the need to subsidize 
infant export industries to fully exploit the information and demand-shifting externalities in 
competitive market equilibrium, as proposed by Vettas. However, two qualifications must be 
stated. First, demand information externalities have a cross-border nature in the case of chocolate   40
confections, in which case it is not clear that one would want to subsidize this activity in 
competitive market equilibrium. Second, a monopolist such as Arcor can deal with these cross-
border externalities by introducing brand and technology barriers to entry. Subsidization of small 
firms in a competitive equilibrium would probably require the introduction of strategic trade 
policies to deter the entry of foreign competitors, making the final welfare effect uncertain. 
Minimal technological spillovers and scant development of an open-to-all network of 
specialized inputs suppliers may suggest that this activity did not have the potential for high 
social return. However, there are several arguments that counter this assertion. First, the presence 
of a monopolist led to an optimal path of investment and export growth in the presence of 
demand information and demand-shifting externalities and made it possible to offset cross-
border externalities. Second, this monopoly power in the new export has allowed substantial 
profit-shifting from foreign competitors. Third, this new activity is allowing the accumulation of 
capabilities for jumping to more sophisticated products both within this industry and in other 
areas. Arcor’s learning-by-doing and learning-by-exporting are allowing it to focus now on R&D 
to develop original products (instead of just doing innovative imitation) with which to target 
markets usually served by developed country firms.  
Additionally, HK’s product space shows that the discovery of exports of chocolate 
confections helped to move Argentina’s export closer to the densest part of this space. For 
instance, chocolate confections lie close to a variety of products related to packing goods, which 
might probably require some of the same capabilities demanded by chocolate confections.
7 
The fact that the accumulation of capabilities occurs within a firm reflects the industrial 
organization of this product’s world markets and should not demean its contribution to economic 
development. Hence we should not be concerned about the fact that there was no diffusion in this 
particular new industry. We should be more concerned about the possibility that most new 
successful export activities in Argentina are discovered only when the pioneer can introduce 
barriers to entry resulting from inadequate public policies, investments and institutions. 
 
                                                 
7  These goods include “paper and paperboard, corrugated, creped, crinkled, etc.,” “articles for the conveyance of 
packing of goods,” “articles of paper pulp, paper, paperboard, cellular wadding,” “aluminum and aluminum alloys, 
worked,” “reservoirs, tanks, vats and similar containers,” “casks, drums, boxes of iron/steel for packing goods,” and 
“structures and parts of structures, iron/steel plates.”   41
6. Case Study of Biotechnology Applied to Human Health (BHH) 
 
6.1 Background Information 
 
6.1.1 BHH around the World 
 
Biotechnological advances in human health have been revolutionary. While in 1995 there were 
only 15 biotechnological drugs on world markets, this number has since grown to 80. Prominent 
examples include human insulin, hepatitis B vaccine, EPO, G-CSF, and human growth 
hormone.
8  
This technology makes it possible to obtain large quantities of therapeutic proteins that in 
the past could only be extracted in small amounts. Processes for obtaining these proteins include 
fermentation, extraction, purification and formulation. In human health care, biotechnology 
products include diagnostic tests, antibiotics, therapies and vaccines.   
The importance of biotechnology in the pharmaceutical sector is becoming very 
significant: in 2003, seven of the top 50 pharmaceutical products sold around the world were 
biotechnological. The combined sales of these seven products reached US$15 billion, more than 
10 percent of total sales (US$129 billion) of the 50 main medicines. An additional 370 
medicines, intended to fight more than 200 illnesses including Alzheimer’s disease, AIDS, 
arthritis and several kinds of cancer, are currently being tested in clinical trials.   
The main hurdles for participating in BHH targeted to rich country markets are high 
research, development and commercialization costs, which on average represent around US$800 
million per new product. Furthermore, the R&D success rates for innovative projects are 
normally less than one in a thousand.  
Although an important part of the research in rich countries is undertaken by small new  
biotechnological labs, the discoveries end up being adopted by big corporations (by license 
agreements), because these new firms cannot face the high costs that these developments entail.  
In biotechnology there is no possibility of copying. Even if a product already exists and is 
not protected by patents in certain markets, a laboratory that wants to produce it has to develop it 
completely from scratch through costly R&D, as only the final product is known and not the 
process whereby it was obtained. The success rate for this kind of development, however, is 
                                                 
8  Biotechnology is a collection of technologies that entail the use of cellular and biomolecular processes to solve 
problems or make useful products. To these ends it takes advantage of the fact that the DNA information manual of 
one cell can be read and implemented by cells from other living things and the genetic instructions to make a certain 
protein are understood by many different types of cells.   42
much higher than for innovative BHH products: about one third of bio-generic projects succeed 
if the right research team is assembled. 
 
6.1.2  BHH in Argentina 
 
The application of biotechnology to human health in Argentina is focused on two principal areas: 
biopharmaceuticals and diagnostic reactives. The main biopharmaceuticals produced in 
Argentina are human erythropoietin, human interpherons, G-CSF and growth hormones. These 
products are sold both domestically and abroad.  
Since diagnostic reactives are sold mostly in the domestic market, we will focus on 
biopharmaceuticals. This segment was targeted by the national pharmaceutical industry in the 
1980s through biotechnology developments that became mature a decade later. These 
laboratories self-financed these research investments and made use of local researchers in the 
area of life sciences. 
Argentine biopharmaceuticals rapidly gained world market shares during the mid-1990s. 
In just 10 years international sales of these types of BHH products rose from US$1.6 million to 
approximately US$25 million (see Figure 3).    
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Source: IERAL from Fundación Mediterránea based on INDEC. 
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Argentina’s exports of biopharmaceuticals not only grew very rapidly, but also showed a 
remarkable geographic diversification. The number of destinations for these exports jumped 
from only 11 countries in 1996 to 40 countries at the time of writing (see Figure 4).  
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Source: IERAL from Fundación Mediterránea based on INDEC. 
 
This diversification also helped reduce the geographic concentration of exports, reducing 
the share of exports to Brazil from 65 percent in 1998 to less than 25 percent at present.   
The main export destinations are South American countries (66 percent of total sales in 
2005), East Asian countries (around 20 percent) and the Middle East, regions composed of   
intermediate development countries, which compare very favorably to rich countries in terms of 
less stringent barriers to entry (patents, registry requirements and costs of clinical approval tests). 
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Figure 5. Exports by Main Destinations 




























Source: IERAL from Fundación Mediterránea based on INDEC.   45
Brazil and the rest of MERCOSUR played an important role at the onset due to the 
knowledge of regional diseases that Argentine labs had developed and to the fact that the 
Brazilian BHH sector still had not fully developed.  
Exports grew very fast until 2001, favored both by Argentina’s initial advantage within 
Mercosur and by the domestic recession between 1999 and 2001. The recovery of the domestic 
market after 2002, together with the expansion of the Brazilian BHH sector, reduced exports, 
which nevertheless quickly resumed their growing trend. 
 
6.2 Analysis of the Emergence of This Export Sector
9  
 
6.2.1 Who Was the Pioneer? Why Did it Target This New Activity? 
 
The pioneer for producing and exporting BHH products in Argentina is Bio Sidus, a spin-off of 
Sidus, a relatively large domestic pharmaceutical laboratory with a long tradition of producing 
traditional human health products (mostly generic drugs) for local and regional markets with less 
restrictive intellectual property rights regimes. Sidus is also involved in horizontally related 
biotechnological activities, applied to plants and to animals, through spin-offs in those areas.  
The firm’s initial developments and exports included interpheron-alpha, its first product, 
and erythropoietin (EPO), the firm’s main export product. The first developments took place 
shortly after this activity emerged in industrialized countries in the late 1980s and preceded by 
several years those of other Argentine firms that managed to develop similar saleable BHH 
products. Indeed, Bio Sidus managed to develop these products earlier than in most other 
developing countries, and even before several more developed countries. For instance, the 
commercialization of EPO in rich countries started in 1989, and Bio Sidus was already an active 
exporter in the mid-1990s. As a result Argentina is currently the world’s seventeenth-largest 
exporter of EPO, lagging only very rich countries and selling 66 percent more than South Korea 
and Mexico (its two closest followers) and almost three times as much as Brazil. 
Exports took off at the same time as domestic production. Although the firm’s research 
and development initially targeted the domestic market, it soon became clear that Bio Sidus 
                                                 
9  The analysis is based on interviews with Bio Sidus executives (Carlos Melo, R&D Manager), Laboratorio Pablo 
Cassará executives (Jorge Cassará), Foro Argentino de Biotecnología executives (Juan Dellacha, Science Director; 
María Marta de McCarthy, Manager), Biocientífica (Diagnosis biotechnology) executives (Daniel Villamayor), Elea 
executives (Dr. Hector Ostrowski, R&D Manager Director), Massone executives (Raúl Massone), and Foro de 
Biotecnología (J.Carlos Villalpando).   46
could compete successfully in developing countries that were not targeted by rich country firms. 
As a result, Bio Sidus currently exports approximately US$17 million a year (68 percent of its 
total sales). 
The key reason for targeting these new goods and exports was the need to find new 
profitable activities that help overcome the profit reduction in traditional pharmaceutical 
activities caused by increasingly stringent patent protection. This is akin to an exogenous shock 
that “shook the tree” and forced the monkeys to jump to other trees. The resources sunk into 
traditional pharmaceutical activities generated incentives to consider this new activity.
10  
Bio Sidus’ experience in the traditional pharmaceutical industry additionally allowed it to 
identify BHH in developing countries as an export market that was underserved by rich country 
labs. There are several reasons why rich country labs were not serving less developed country 
markets. The relatively laxer IPRs in the latter would not prevent the entry of competing labs 
from less developed countries that could sell at a lower price. As BHH markets appear not to be 
segmented, the price reduction required from rich country labs to serve less developed country 
markets would erode the monopoly profits in rich country markets more than it would contribute 
to greater profits through the capture of new markets. In this regard, it should be noted that rich 
country labs face much larger fixed and variable costs than their counterparts in less developed 
countries for the following reasons: a) the high cost of clinical approval of new products 
(US$500,000); b) more stringent quality management standards in rich country labs, which must 
employ three times more personnel in traceability during the internal processes than labs in 
poorer countries; c) higher R&D and commercialization costs in developing original goods and 
cultivating markets for these goods (US$800 million per new product, on average). For a typical 
rich country BHH lab production costs represent 5 percent of gross revenues, marketing costs 15 
percent and R&D amortization 30 percent, yielding a 50 percent profit margin (over gross 
revenues) that makes it possible to amortize the investment in 3-4 months. A good example of 
the difference in costs between rich and LDC labs is given by the cost of applying for patents in 
the US or the EU (about US$500,000) and in Brazil (US$8,000).  
The combination of lower costs for LDC labs and monopoly power in rich countries for 
developed country labs give the former a competitive edge in poorer country markets. Bio Sidus 
was able to exploit this edge, which may cease to exist in the future as rich country labs are 
                                                 
10 See Hidalgo et al. (2007) and footnote 2 above.     47
shifting their strategies and starting to patent their new developments everywhere (as in the case 
of monoclonal antibodies for treating cancer).  
Another window of opportunity for targeting this activity was given by the fact that even 
though requirements in terms of fixed investment in physical capital for production are more 
important than those prevalent in the traditional pharmaceutical sector, developing BHH 
products demands a relatively lower investment in R&D. The R&D process in traditional 
pharmaceutical activity may last seven years and in the end yield no useful result. On the other 
hand, R&D in BHH is more similar to a reverse engineering process: it is known that the body 
produces a certain product (leukocytes, for instance), and what the research does is to try to 
identify this bodily production process and to replicate it outside the body. This relatively 
smaller barrier to entry facilitated the investment of a national laboratory like Sidus. 
 
6.2.2 What Were the Main Uncertainties Regarding the Profitability of Exports? How Were They 
Resolved? What Was Discovered?  
 
Two types of uncertainties had to be resolved before there could be a breakthrough in the BHH 
business in the market segments targeted by the pioneer. First, Bio Sidus had to resolve a 
country-wide, systemic type of uncertainty, which is whether the human capital in Argentina was 
adequate for developing BHH products of the desired technological sophistication. Second, it 
had to resolve an idiosyncratic technological uncertainty: whether their research effort would 
yield the development of the desired product. Bio Sidus avoided clinical and foreign demand 
uncertainties at the beginning by focusing on “imitating” products that were already clinically 
approved and well established in world markets. 
 
Ability to develop the good. When Bio Sidus targeted BHH it was not clear if the human capital 
available in Argentina would have the ability to develop the new goods. Thus, the firm had to 
search for capable researchers and “experiment” to see if they could succeed. To this end Bio 
Sidus initially established contacts with CONICET scientists (who had no previous experience in 
developing commercially viable products), conducting a trial-and-error process until finding   
found the right researchers who, under the supervision and training of repatriated Argentine 
pharmaceutical researchers, managed to successfully develop interpheron alpha. The discovery 
of this untapped accumulated capability by Bio Sidus was an externality that is recognized by 
Argentine newcomers as a key determinant of their entering this sector.    48
Then there was the idiosyncratic uncertainty as to whether the R&D effort would 
succeed. The research success of Bio Sidus (as high as 70 percent) was based on focusing its 
R&D effort on a narrow set of goods (i.e., applying a linear model of innovation). This 
knowledge is fully proprietary (a “knowledge niche”), at least in principle.  
It must be highlighted that the firm’s prior history in pharmaceutical activities did not 
provide it with any special knowledge on conducting R&D in this BHH. It was necessary to start 
from the scratch, because pharmaceutical laboratories in Argentina did not develop original 
products, but instead engaged only in reverse engineering in generic drugs, a relatively easy task 
using information contained in patents. Bio Sidus hence lacked a specific research protocol and 
an  a priori identification of qualified researchers that could successfully develop these new 
goods. 
 
Production costs. Production costs were neither uncertain nor crucial for Bio Sidus’ acquisition 
of competitiveness. All that it needed was to be able to supply sophisticated products to countries 
with relatively lax IPRs at a lower price than its rich country counterparts. 
 
Clinical and demand uncertainties. Original new developments involve three layers of 
uncertainty: a) technological (the development itself); b) clinical (the new product must be 
approved by health authorities); and c) commercial (there has to be a market for the good).  
The initial strategy of Bio Sidus was to focus on the development of a product (the 
interpheron-alpha) already existing in the global market, clinically and commercially proved, and 
to produce it at a cheaper price and with similar quality.  
Their focus on “non-IP” country markets (which was not a choice, but rather their only 
possibility) also reduced uncertainty, because in order to enter these countries they only have to 
demonstrate chemical equivalence of the new products (which is relatively cheap and offers no 
uncertainties). Developed countries still maintain, and in many cases are extending, patents on 
these goods. When the patent period expires they are likely to introduce the further requirement 
of testing for clinical efficiency (on the scientific grounds that chemical equivalence does not 
apply to BHH because each BHH product is “different”). These extra requirements would not 
only sizably increase the costs of entry, but also introduce idiosyncratic uncertainty regarding 
clinical efficiency. 
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Commercialization strategies.  There is little (if any) uncertainty involved in the 
commercialization strategies in “non-IP”  countries, where Bio Sidus exports goods that are only 
vertically differentiated (and where there were no initial competitors) and hence need no special 
commercialization strategies.  
 
6.2.3 Were There Any Coordination Externalities? How Were They Resolved? 
 
When Bio Sidus began research on BHH there was neither a specific regulatory framework for 
this activity in Argentina, nor specific public policy instruments to support this type of 
investment. The lack of public sector knowledge on how to deal with these new activities made 
matters such as sanitary or product quality approvals more difficult. Although there was arguably 
a coordination failure (no regulatory framework and specific support policies because the sector 
does not exist and vice-versa), it was obviously not large enough to prevent Bio Sidus from 
making investments. Being a large firm, it could use its own resources to finance investments 
before the regulatory framework and domestic basic infrastructure were in place.  
As the pioneer made progress with its research, it started to collaborate with (or 
“instruct”) the involved public agencies in the construction of the sectoral regulatory framework, 
on how to evaluate BHH projects and on how to design specific promotion mechanisms. In so 
doing, it provided a public good to followers. However, this a was only partially a public good, 
as the new regulations initially reflected the particular needs and experience of Bio Sidus and did 
not provide a general framework. In some cases these tailor-made regulations may have operated 
as a barrier to entry.  
Most of the specialized inputs for this industry can be imported, eliminating this possible 
source of coordination failure. Access to adequate technological infrastructure (accredited 
clinical analysis labs, etc.) was not an overwhelming issue for the large national laboratories (Bio 
Sidus, Cassará), which either already had them as a result of their activity in the pharmaceutical 
sector or could finance them.  
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6.2.4 Why Was the Investment in New Exports Successful? 
The keys for the success were the combination of entrepreneurial vision, selecting the right R&D 
team, and lots of luck, according to Bio Sidus executives. We can distinguish between the 
specific actions and strategies that the pioneer took to resolve the uncertainty and the 
characteristics of the pioneer that facilitated undertaking this risky investment. 
The specific actions have been discussed above: locating workers with the appropriate 
human capital, focusing on a narrow range of products already in existence that were clinically 
and commercially approved), and targeting the underserved market for relatively inexpensive 
equivalents to BHH products produced in rich countries with a similar level of quality.  
This success was facilitated by Sidus’ previous experience in the pharmaceutical sector, 
targeting similar product and market ranges and successfully adapting products to the 
characteristics, pathologies and requirements of developing country markets. This experience is 
common to most national pharmaceutical firms in Argentina, but Bio Sidus was the first to 
exploit it successfully in BHH.  
The company’s scale in traditional pharmaceuticals also gave it access to resources for 
the internal financing of the required substantial investment in R&D and in obtaining clinical 
and/or commercial approval for new products. (The importance of this process can hardly be 
overstated, as technological development generally requires at least six years, and obtaining 
regulatory approval usually requires about four years). Bio Sidus’ decision to invest its own 
revenues from traditional pharmaceutical activities in highly uncertain new developments in 
biotechnology set it apart for a good number of years from the other domestic laboratories. 
Prior knowledge in the pharmaceutical sector allowed Bio Sidus to choose BHH products 
where it would take longer for competitors from other developing countries to emerge, i.e., that 
had greater technological barriers to entry in the relevant market segments. These products had 
to be such that they demanded an R&D effort that was beyond the scope of pharmaceutical firms 
in most developing countries at that time but not beyond Bio Sidus’ possibilities. The targeted 
products also had to offer learning economies in R&D activities that would later allow the 
company to jump to develop more sophisticated products. Competition had to be avoided not 
only until the initial investment could be amortized with the monopoly benefits of the initial 
development but also until the firm had developed its next product.    51
 The company’s family ownership structure was also an asset, as it allowed for rapid 
decision-making and changing strategies. Large laboratories in developed countries do not have 
the flexibility to start these new projects (even though where barriers to entry are smaller because 
BHH does not involve large fixed physical capital requirements). Hence technological 
developments are usually undertaken by small and medium labs and then sold to the big 
laboratories. In Argentina, however, the pioneer firm carries out almost 100 percent of its 
product development “in house,” which demands a great deal of flexibility.  
 
6.2.5 What Was Done to Consolidate the New Export Success?  
The pioneer initially was a temporary monopolist in products that lacked horizontal 
differentiation and where the only barriers to entry were scale economies in R&D. The company 
exploited this monopoly position while it lasted by trying to sell its products in as many “non-IP” 
countries as possible and by applying part of these profits to developing its own versions of 
already-existing products (interpheron beta, G-CSF, etc.) that would provide it with new 
temporary monopoly profits  
6.2.6 What Impact (Actual and Potential) Did the New Exports Have on the Pioneer and on the 
Sector (Knowledge and Other Spillovers)? 
 
Information revelation. The pioneer revealed the important information that the human capital 
available in Argentina was suitable for R&D in BHH developments. This knowledge externality 
was not, however, sufficiently large to induce a massive diffusion of this activity, given that the 
specific knowledge of how to produce the good remains proprietary. Newcomers know that there 
are researchers that can carry out this type of R&D, but they still have to commit their own 
capital and engage in the process independently.  
Even the revelation that human capital was suitable was for R&D in BHH was not that 
large of a knowledge externality, as Cassará, the most important follower of Bio Sidus, could 
undertake successful R&D only after hiring former Bio Sidus researchers. Another big domestic 
laboratory (Roemmers) sank significant capital into R&D and yet failed because of hiring 
researchers who lacked “commercial vision.”  
 
Pioneer’s learning and productivity improvement and its static and dynamic spillovers.  Bio 
Sidus initially targeted developments that allowed it to acquire resources and increased learning 
on general R&D skills, which facilitate new developments farther up the technological ladder.   52
These previous developments provided improved research know-how that can reduce by 25 
percent the time needed for R&D activities, with substantial financial savings. Nonetheless,   
there do not exist major specific technological spillovers between one particular development 
and the next, i.e., previous developments do not provide any increased knowledge as to whether 
a new molecule is going to “work.” 
The pioneer is now preparing to access the high-income markets of the European Union, 
the United States, Japan and Australia, which represent 90 percent of the world market, in the 
events that patents on BHH products such as EPO cease to apply and bio-generic rules are 
approved for BHH. The firms is also applying its profits and acquired learning in BHH R&D to 
developing original highly sophisticated processes and/or products, some of which have already 
been developed and patented and are awaiting clinical approval. This new BHH R&D phase, that 
has yet to bear fruit in the technological, clinical or commercial aspects of this business, may 
have important implications for the pioneer in terms of allowing it to engage in product 
differentiation and brand development, and of giving it access to higher prices and to bigger and 
more prolonged monopoly profits. One of these new developments is the “pharmaceutical milk 
farm” (“tambo farmaceútico”) that produces human growth hormone, an already existing 
product, through an innovative process that allows the direct extraction of this hormone from 
cows’ milk, followed by purification. This is a much more productive technology than the 
traditional (biotechnological) methods of obtaining this hormone through the fermentation of 
biotechnologically modified cells, bacteria or yeasts. 
Bio Sidus is also engaged in the development of on the development of a new product, 
known as gene therapy (instead of modifying bacteria, yeast or other non-human cells, genetic 
modification is carried out upon cells of the human body). If the company successfully  develops 
this product it will probably have to find a partner for clinical trials, which are estimated to cost 
US$300 million. 
 
Improvement of the functioning of the national innovation system. A traditional criticism of 
Argentina’s national innovation system is that there exists a wide gap between the research 
agenda of public agencies and the needs of the business sector, and very little spillover between 
the public and private sectors, leading to sub-optimal investment in R&D by Argentine firms 
(see FIDES, 2006). This situation, however, has been changing in recent years. For instance,   53
there is now a mechanism that allows public sector researchers to undertake internships in 
private firms. Bio Sidus was one of the main promoters of these changes, albeit not the only one. 
The government’s recent interest in promoting R&D, possibly fostered by the demonstration 
effect of Bio Sidus and others, was also very important in this regard.  
 
Intersectoral spillovers. In addition to BHH, Bio Sidus is also very active in plant and animal 
biotechnology. For instance, it is one of the leaders in the application of biotechnology to plant 
propagation, which allowed it to become one of the main producers and exporters of blueberries, 
another successful new export activity in Argentina. Similarly, one of Bio Sidus’ most promising 
new developments in BHH, the “pharmaceutical milk farm,” combines animal and human 
biotechnology.  
 
6.2.7 Was There Diffusion of this Export Activity? What were the Key Drivers of this Diffusion 
(or lack of)? 
 
Extent of diffusion among firms located in Argentina. Although Bio Sidus is still the leader 
among BHH exporters, a large number of Argentinean firms have started exporting in recent 
years. While in 1996 only 12 firms realized exports greater than US$10,000, that number 
reached 44 in 2005 (see Figure 6). This diffusion made the share of Bio Sidus in total sectoral 
exports fall from approximately 80 percent during the second half of the 1990s to an average or 
65 percent in recent years (see Table 3). 
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Source: IERAL from Fundación Mediterránea based on INDEC. 
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The main exporting firm after Bio Sidus is Laboratory Cassará, and only these two firms 
have recorded exports exceeding US$1 million in recent years. The list of exporters of BHH 
products includes firms of different relative sizes that encompass international labs, universities 
and small innovative firms. While some of these small and medium firms produce and export 
their own developments, other firms, mainly international labs, produce with licenses or merely 
commercialize. 
Table 3. Main Exporting Biopharmaceutical Firms*  
(in dollars) 
Name 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
BIO SIDUS S.A. 26.16 77.43 83.09 78.32 76.12 80.66 70.14 71.47 69.91 58.08
LABORATORIO PABLO CASSARA 5.22 0.69 2.45 6.28 11.57 6.04 4.17 8.56 5.42 9.05
INSTITUTO MASSONE S.A. 7.20 3.12 2.27 1.55 0.85 0.92 1.96 2.43 2.21 2.90
UNIVERSIDAD NAC.DE CORDOBA 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.27 1.17 0.67 1.65 2.89
FERRING SA. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.89 1.09 2.31
BAXTER IMMUNO S.A. 2.88 1.25 0.02 0.25 0.20 0.47 0.02 0.32 0.34 2.30
BIOPROFARMA SA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.51 0.77 1.97
SANDOZ SA. 1.64 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.77 2.24 1.88
PC GEN S.A. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.90 4.38 1.88
SCHERING-PLOUGH S.A. 15.96 5.42 2.56 2.76 2.14 0.88 3.82 1.78 1.30 2.66
LABORATORIOS POEN S.A.C.I.F.I. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.82 1.44 1.75
PURISSIMUS S.A. 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.97 0.82 0.23 0.51 1.44 0.71 1.62
MONTE VERDE S.A. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.46 0.39 1.49
LABORATORIO ELEA SACIFA. 0.01 0.08 0.03 1.43 0.93 0.58 0.81 1.26 0.98 1.43
PRODUCTOS ROCHE S.A.Q.E.I. 11.47 3.21 2.27 2.71 1.85 2.41 6.18 2.42 1.17 0.99
AGROINSUMOS S.A 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.69 1.04 0.87
SERVYCAL S.A. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.12 0.84
BIOGENESIS S.A. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.23 0.48
GRIFOLS ARGENTINA S.A. 2.25 0.24 0.04 0.16 0.15 0.04 0.19 0.42 0.31 0.45
M.R. PHARMA S.A. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.28 1.27 0.42
Subtotal 72.78 91.62 92.76 94.43 94.91 92.51 90.04 96.16 96.98 96.24
Others 27.22 8.38 7.24 5.57 5.09 7.49 9.96 3.84 3.02 3.76
TOTAL 1,644,789 10,155,404 17,713,268 22,868,252 27,447,422 30,776,553 19,878,228 19,899,258 25,069,518 24,405,140
$  
* Firms with annual sales of more than US$10,000.  
Source: IERAL from Fundación Mediterránea based on Aduana Argentina. 
 
The number of exporting firms and of exported products may become more significant if 
several ongoing R&D efforts (which take 10 years to mature) bear the expected fruits.   
 
Regional and global competitors. There have emerged a significant large number of competitors 
in Asian countries and several developing nations that target the same products and market 
segments as those initially targeted by Bio Sidus. For instance, in 2004 Argentina was in the 
same club (defined by export value) for the exports of BHH products as South Korea, the Czech 
Republic and Singapore; other upcoming exporters are India, China and Russia. In the case of 
EPO, Argentina’s exports ranked immediately after those of Singapore and before those of South 
Korea. India is one of the upcoming exporters for this good.  
Asian countries are able to export lower priced BHH products because of lower 
traceability requirements and lower demands of clinical security before putting their products on 
the market. For instance, in China there are about 30 BHH labs (a large number) that produce   55
EPO. More than half of their developments, however, are of poor quality, while three or four are 
fair and only and only two or three may be considered good. Firms realize major savings in R&D 
and financial costs by going to market before their products are thoroughly tested. They continue 
learning as they test their products in the market (by seeing their effects on actual patients), and 
their products eventually improve, but with considerable health risks. There have been cases of 
exports of vaccines through WHO price-based bidding processes that were won by suppliers that 
lacked clinical approval in the recipient country. 
 
6.2.8 Determinants of Extent of Diffusion 
Newcomers in this sector in Argentina may benefit from some partial knowledge externalities 
produced by the pioneer, but they must sink capital into R&D to resolve their own idiosyncratic 
uncertainty about the ability to produce the good. Entering later than the pioneer means that 
targeting the same goods and market segments involves competing with exporters from other 
countries that are already targeting those markets.  
The newcomers have not hurt the pioneer’s profits because of the time lag between the 
pioneer’s developments and those of its followers and because of the relatively small size of the 
latter vis-à-vis the Asian competitors.  Likewise, diffusion has not yet led to an increase in the 
costs of research. Additionally, followers in Argentina, while initially targeting the same goods 
as the pioneer, are now focusing on different varieties for their subsequent developments.  
The most prominent of those followers, Laboratorio Pablo Cassará, entered BHH   
business as a result of its association with former Bio Sidus researchers. This allowed it to 
“develop” the same initial goods as the pioneer (e.g., interpheron alpha, G-CSF), without having 
to face the uncertainty and fixed costs associated with product development and without concern 
for relatively low prices at the time of entry. This association also provided the firm with general 
knowledge on how to perform successful R&D in BHH. Like the pioneer, Cassará was a 
relatively large domestic and traditional pharmaceutical lab that decided to invest in and finance 
its own biotechnological research, taking advantage of the high profits obtained in its traditional 
activity. While starting later than Bio Sidus, Cassará shared its motivation and several other 
facilitating factors. Cassará had also observed the pioneer’s success in finding workers with the 
appropriate human capital. Their search for projects and adequate research personnel coincided   56
with the departure of some of the original researchers of Bio Sidus, an association that proved 
highly advantageous.   
Two interesting features emerge from Cassará’s experience. First, following its initial 
“success” in developing products similar to those of the pioneer, Cassará decided to specialize in 
different products, such as vaccines, in subsequent developments (although both firms are still 
very active in “traditional” BHH products, such as EPO, interpheron-alpha and G-CSF). To 
pursue these new projects Cassará is associating with large international laboratories (e.g., 
Aventis Pasteur), which will deal with financing clinical approval in rich country markets. For 
instance, Cassará has created a new hepatitis vaccine that requires one less dose than existing 
version—an important advance in the prevention of this illness because less than 20 percent of 
those vaccinated actually complete the third dose. This vaccine is going to be produced and 
commercialized at an international level by an international lab in cooperation with Cassará.  
Therefore, if the vaccine enters the world market as an Argentinean product and is distributed 
through the global network by a transnational lab, the country’s BHH exports will sizably 
increase in the years ahead. At the same time, the lab is already working on a vaccine of just one 
dose that has already been approved in animals and is beginning to be studied in humans.  
The second interesting feature of Cassará is that it did not hire former Bio Sidus 
researchers but instead associated with them. This form of partnership probably arose from the 
bargaining power of the latter, who could “sell” their knowledge to any firm. These researchers 
formed an SME (named PCGen) that received financing from Cassará and developed products 
for it. Although PCGen was located in the same building as Cassará, it was free to pursue its own 
projects. It is also associating with other SMEs to pool financial and research resources for more 
ambitious projects. More generally, Cassará is outsourcing specific processes (such as protein 
purification to PCGen) or particular products (such as hepatitis vaccines, where they were 
partners with the local branch of Sanofi Pasteur). This organization of research activity facilitates 
technological spillovers. 
Up to now diffusion has been restricted mostly to pharmaceutical firms that have enough 
resources to invest in new developments. The absence of wide capital markets in Argentina 
restricts the development of small laboratories, whereas in developed countries with wide capital 
markets there is a proliferation of small biotechnological laboratories that invest in a single 
project and sell the enterprise (“project”) when they have achieved technological success.    57
There are also important deficiencies in the industry-specific public good area that may 
hamper adequate diffusion of biotechnology to SMEs. One such deficiency is the lack of a mass 
spectrometer, which is very costly; Bio Sidus has these analyses carried out in the United 
Kingdom because investment in this equipment cannot be amortized by an individual firm’s 
sales. 
 
6.2.9   Roles of Previously Accumulated Capabilities, Industry-Specific Public Goods and Public 
Policies 
 
The presence of pre-existing national pharmaceutical laboratories that had the resources and 
flexible decision-making to finance medium and long term R&D activities, together with their 
accumulated capabilities for dealing with the characteristics and needs of developing countries’ 
markets, greatly facilitated the takeoff of BHH in Argentina.  
Argentina also benefited from its relatively large endowment of scientifically skilled 
biological and medical researchers, including several Nobel laureates in those areas, and from 
the quality of the available lab technicians. Argentina nonetheless suffered from a scarcity of 
local researchers in the pharmaceutical industry, since national labs were engaged in reverse 
engineering of existing drugs, an activity that does not require an original research effort. 
However, accumulated research capabilities in life sciences, especially in public universities and 
public research institutions such as CONICET, provided the “general” skills for conducting 
applied research with a commercial orientation in BHH, and local researchers have worked under 
the supervision of experienced pharmaceutical researchers brought from abroad. This 
endowment of scientists allowed the sector to emerge in Argentina ahead of countries such as 
Brazil and Chile, which in the early 1980s lacked those resources. (It should be noted, though, 
that they have recently reversed this drawback and are currently better endowed than Argentina). 
Although public sector support has not always proven adequate, it has improved over 
time. For instance, the most suitable innovation promotion mechanisms at that time, like Banco 
Provincia de Buenos Aires Argentech credits and subsidies, had a three year-year time horizon, 
much shorter than the span of up to 10 years needed to develop new BHH products. After the 
Argentech credit, Bio Sidus managed to obtain credits from the Secretaría de Ciencia y 
Tecnología (SECyT) and some subsidies (fiscal credits). Cassará and other smaller laboratories 
also benefited from SECyT credits and subsidies from SECyT.    58
In the last 10 years the design of innovation support policies has undergone extensive 
changes, making them more compatible with the requirements of BHH enterprises. Support 
allocation rules became more flexible, and specific rules for specific uses were designed (for 
instance, adapting the time span of credits to biotechnology development). The creation of the 
Agencia Nacional de Promoción Científica y Tecnológica, and its two main instruments, the 
Fondo para la Investigación Científica y Tecnológica (FONCyT) and the Fondo Tecnológico 
Argentino (FONTAR), have contributed significantly to the financing of different projects by 
BHH firms. The lack of adequate public knowledge about the BHH sector was an obstacle at the 
beginning, but the agency went through a learning process, facilitated by joint efforts with the 
project sector, that improved its functioning and the adequacy of its instruments to the sector’s 
needs. The firms interviewed for this study highly valued highly the role of the Agency and its 
instruments (non-reimbursable subsidies and long-term credits).  
The large number of SMEs currently conducting research in BHH in Argentina at the 
same time as such research is being undertaken in rich countries raises the question of whether 
their future expansion will be associated mostly with selling their projects to large traditional 
laboratories or whether public support will suffice to give small labs a chance to commercialize 
their own developments. 
 
6.3 Counterfactual Analysis 
The case of Brazil, which lags significantly in the development of its BHH sector, offers a good 
counterfactual for understanding the key features behind the successful emergence of this sector 
in Argentina. This is an interesting case because the Brazilian government is providing important 
support to this sector, significant BHH research is undertaken in universities and public agencies 
and there currently is a greater availability of life science researchers than Argentina had at the 
onset.  
The Brazilian BHH sector’s lack of development is puzzling given the fact that the 
country is one of world’s 10 largest pharmaceutical markets. The national pharmaceutical 
industry, however, is poorly developed and the domestic market is dominated by foreign or 
multinational firms. Only one of the 10 most important laboratories (the Grupo Aché) in Brazil is 
domestically owned (Magalhaes, 2003). This feature to some explains low levels of investment   59
in pharmaceutical R&D, which is also one of the biggest hurdles to the development of Brazil’s 
BHH sector.   
In the 1980s Brazil was self-sufficient in medicines, but during the 1990s multinational 
laboratories changed their strategy, closing some plants and production lines. Pharmaceutical 
imports became increasingly important, and in 2003 were 15 times higher than in 1989, whereas 
overall imports increased only twofold during that time. Accordingly, the net exports of this 
industry deteriorated markedly, its import/export ratio rose from 2.6 in 1989 to 6 in 2003. 
Conversely, in Argentina the domestic market is mainly supplied by national laboratories 
(approximately 15 percent of domestic sales are imports, and the import/export ratio has 
remained at 2 since 1990). Brazil’s shrinking national pharmaceutical sector and a growing 
trend towards importing medicines thus prevented it from accumulating capabilities to develop 
the BHH sector.  
The increasing number of mergers and acquisitions in the pharmaceutical industry at a 
world level during the 1990s made it additionally difficult to overcome this “negative” feature of 
the sector’s industrial organization in Brazil. Not only was there increasing concentration among 
firms, but several national laboratories that had undertaken R&D in new biopharmaceuticals 
were also bought by international firms that subsequently discontinued this line of business. Such 
was the case of Biobras, a producer of insulin that was making important innovations in BHH. 
Equally important, the initial endowment of human capital in Brazil was far from 
adequate. Professionals in life science were scarce 20 years ago, and this disadvantage impeded 
the BHH industry’s growth. This situation is changing, however, and the supply of human 
resources more closely meets the needs of the nascent BHH industry. The lack of national 
laboratories is still a hindrance, however, as Brazil’s BHH research and production infrastructure 
is well-developed only in immunological products, an area exclusively run by the public sector.  
The dearth of skilled personnel in some specific areas of production of equipment and 
inputs and the poor technological infrastructure of many public research-related institutions 
further limit the development of the sector (Da Silveira et al, 2004). However, Argentina 
suffered (and still suffers) similar restrictions and yet managed to succeed in the development of 
the sector.    60
Last but not least, the timing of development proved crucial.  Benefits at the beginning 
were extremely high, but the present surge in global competitors, mainly from Asian countries, 
has substantially reduced profit margins.  
The determinants of the Brazilian BHH sector’s failure to take off suggest that the key 
drivers of success in Argentina were: a) the presence of national pharmaceutical laboratories, 
with the resources, flexibility and willingness to undertake risky R&D investments and with 
accumulated industry-specific capabilities; and b) the availability of life science researchers. 
These factors were especially important for entering world markets before Asian labs started 
bringing prices down. 
 
6.4 Welfare Analysis 
In this case the pioneer appears to have faced a somewhat smaller degree of uncertainty than the 
industry average regarding the suitability of local human capital, because of its history of 
contacts with public sector scientists. However, this advantage should not be overstated, as the 
pioneer did not really know beforehand if local researchers would be up to the challenge. Hence, 
while uncertainty was shared by everyone in the sector, the information externality was relatively 
large. 
Despite this large information externality, there does not appear to be an insufficient level 
of ex ante investment in discovery. This was due to the technological and scale barriers arising 
from the proprietary nature of the knowledge resulting in R&D in this activity. Additionally, 
initial rents were very large, and the Argentine competitors who eventually entered the sector 
were too small to reduce the pioneer’s profits. The circumvention of credit constraints through 
self-financing and the relative abundance of skilled scientists also facilitated the endeavor. 
Finally, focusing on a narrow range of goods facilitated targeting R&D resources to ensure 
success.  
There are obvious trade-offs between concentration and diffusion in the presence of 
limited financial and research resources. All firms understand the importance of focusing on a 
narrow range of products in the presence of large fixed costs of R&D, with the probability of 
success increasing with the size of the investment. Hence a concentrated sector will probably 
specialize in a relatively narrow range of goods, although possibly exploiting dynamic learning 
economies in R&D that allow them to jump up to more sophisticated products and markets. On   61
the other hand, more diffusion could lead to experimentation in a larger variety of BHH goods 
(so as to avoid splitting demand) and to the discovery of more “knowledge niches” for 
Argentina, although with a smaller probability of success in each of them. This is the usual trade- 
off between scale and variety. Our appraisal is that there should be more diffusion than the one 
currently observed at the export level. In this vein, there are many ongoing research projects 
undertaken both by large and small labs, which may bear fruit in the near future and lead to a 
substantial diffusion of exports. 
More diffusion is also required to increase the number of technological spillovers through 
the movement of R&D personnel among firms and through the revolving associations between 
BHH SMEs and the large pharmaceutical firms. Greater diffusion is also likely to increase the 
attractiveness of enrolling in biotechnological careers and conducting business-oriented research. 
Infinite diffusion is undesirable, however, as jumping to too many neighboring trees can prevent 
jumping to higher branches. 
This statement is also conditioned by the current size of the export market for Argentine 
BHH firms. As long as the target is the relatively small “non-IP group” of developing countries, 
the scope for diffusion will be more limited. The optimal extent of diffusion is also determined 
by the ability of Argentine firms to shift profits from foreign competitors. More firms that target 
different varieties will probably steal profits from foreign competitors (along vertical or 
horizontal dimensions, depending on the degree of sophistication of the product) rather than from 
Argentine firms.  
In this vein, government policies should be aimed at improving access to financing and 
the availability of business-oriented researchers. Support policies should carefully weigh the true 
commercial potential of new endeavors, as many firms may target research in products that could 
face stiff competition from Asian and other LDC labs when the markets for them mature. 
The choice of this sector appears to offer positive social returns for three reasons. First, 
Argentina had an untapped accumulated capability for this activity (national pharmaceutical 
firms and adequate human capital) that needed to be discovered and exploited. Second, there are 
substantial learning economies in this activity. Hence developing it ahead of other comparable 
countries may generate prolonged and even widening competitive advantages, especially if 
Argentina manages to develop first bio-generics and original products and processes that can be 
sold in rich countries. Third, these sophisticated exports may allow Argentina to jump to more   62
sophisticated trees and branches. HK’s product space shows that BHH exports help the 
Argentinean export basket move closer to the densest part of the forest. These new exports 
probably share some of he capabilities that are required for yet undeveloped exports of goods 
such as “organic chemicals” and “other pharmaceutical products” which are in the same Leamer 
group as BHH products. All these products are of approximately the same high level of 
productivity as BHH.  
 
7. Case Study of Blueberries 
7.1 Background Information 
Before 1992 the production of blueberries was scarce and disperse, and lacked any commercial 
value. Starting that year some varieties of the plant were imported and planted, the first harvest 
took place and the first exports were undertaken by a pioneering entrepreneur. Exports started 
growing fast after 1998, when diffusion became more widespread, and in 2005 total exports 
reached US$28 million, making blueberries Argentina’s seventh-largest largest fruit export.  
Three stages of the value chain had to be developed to support this dynamism: nurseries,  
production and commercialization. Some of the most important exporters are vertically 
integrated, but most of the growth of this sector is explained by newcomers that specialize in a 
specific stage. 
The main consumption markets are in the Northern Hemisphere (the European Union, the 
United States and Japan. Argentina competes with Chile, South Africa and New Zealand in the 
off-season market, which commands more attractive prices than the seasonal market. 
 
7.2  Analysis of the Emergence of this New Sector
11 
7.2.1 Who was the Pioneer? Why Did it Target this New Activity? 
The pioneer was Vergel, a firm established in the early 1990s by entrepreneur Francisco 
Caffarena, an individual  pioneer in the nursery, production and commercialization stages. 
Caffarena had been working as an executive for an important MNC in the automobile industry 
                                                 
11  This analysis is based on interviews with the following individuals: CAPAB (Cámara Argentina de Productores 
de Arándanos y otros Berries): Jorge Pazos, President; Cuinex (nursery and farmer):  Agr. Eng. Marta Arriola and 
Agr. Eng. Manuel Parra: Vergel (nursery, production and commercialization): Francisco Caffarena, President;   
Tecnoplant/Tecnovital (nursery, production and Commercialization):  Federico Bayá, Manager, and Federico 
Bonsini, Operational Chief; SRI (commercialization): Andrea Dopazzo; Jugos del Sur: Francisco Prado, President; 
RIGEL Berries: Javier Formichelli, owner.   63
and wanted to apply his savings to develop his own business. To this end he used a project 
evaluation methodology to search for innovative investment alternatives with highly profitable 
niche export markets in the agricultural sector. He considered a wide variety of products that 
faced a low degree of competition in world markets, including iguanas, capers, asparagus, 
raspberries, chestnuts, artichokes, kiwi fruit and goat cheese. 
The opportunity to cultivate blueberries came by chance, during a business trip to Italy, 
where Caffarena learned about the European off-season market for this fruit from local business 
contacts. A preliminary project evaluation yielded very high expected payoffs, given the high 
world prices in the Northern off-season, which are two to 10 times greater than seasonal prices. 
He thus decided to learn more about the product and to evaluate the feasibility of its production 
in Argentina. To this end he contacted a US nursery, from which he gathered information about 
production techniques and plant varieties. He also contacted UK importers who confirmed his 
initial promising estimations of FOB (free-on-board) prices and export volumes. He also 
discovered that commercialization could be easily handled. Costs of inputs and land in Argentina 
were known, and the expectation of a temporary monopoly period of two to four years before 
potential imitators’ plants could mature, also facilitated his decision. Another contributing factor 
for his choice was the relatively low initial investment that was required. 
However, Caffarena faced a technological uncertainty that threatened to undermine these 
potentially high returns, given that no previous production knowledge was available in 
Argentina. He hence had to pay an initial cost and to invest in experimentation in production 
alternatives. Given that these initial pre-competitive experiments were successful and that the 
expected payoff was so attractive, he decided to invest in production. 
 
7.2.2 What were the Main Ex Ante Uncertainties Regarding the Profitability of Exports? How 
were they Resolved? What was Discovered? Were there Any Surprises?  
 
“Everything was uncertain.”. This phrase from Caffarena sums up to what extent the product 
was new in Argentina. The lack of local experience in the production process was the main 
uncertainty that Caffarena had to face. Cost-benefit analysis and commercialization aspects were 
far less uncertain. 
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Production process. There were several uncertainties at the production stage. First of all, there 
was no previous knowledge among agronomic engineers regarding several important aspects of 
blueberry production, such as climate requirements, soil characteristics, harvest season and 
diseases. The pioneer was able to partly overcome these problems by contracting a US consultant 
to assist him in dealing with different problems regarding production and sanitation, but there 
still remained a high level of uncertainty, which called for experimentation. In fact, a significant 
proportion of plants in the first field died in spite of technical assistance. Second, there was no 
previous knowledge about which varieties of plants imported from the US were the most 
appropriate for Argentina, so Vergel had to import several varieties in order to test them. He also 
had to experiment with plants in his nursery activities, as the imported plants lacked the required 
phytosanitary quality. The pioneer chose to use macro-propagation techniques for increasing the 
rate of plant reproduction, which was cheaper, faster and less uncertain to implement than micro-
propagation techniques (which are much more productive, but require costly and lengthy R&D). 
This decision allowed him to start producing earlier, albeit probably with less reliable plants and 
lower productivity. 
These experiments improved the pioneer’s knowledge of production techniques and 
helped determine the varieties most appropriate for Argentina. Caffarena admitted that in this 
process Vergel initially made “every mistake imaginable.” Once production proved feasible, 
however, uncertainties were significantly reduced, providing useful information for new 
plantings.  Significant uncertainties would nonetheless remain, resulting in low productivity in 
the first plantings.   
 
Regulatory framework. During Caffarena’s search process for the most attractive new activity, 
which lasted more than a year, he faced important regulatory uncertainties. For example, he tried 
to import seedlings to evaluate the viability of producing chestnuts. This experiment was finally 
discontinued because Caffarena was unable to fill out SENASA forms that required him to 
provide technical information that was impossible to know prior to production; for example, he 
had to provide the expected harvest date, which was impossible to determine since this variety 
was new in Argentina. In the case of blueberries it was also uncertain whether SENASA would 
allow Vergel to import new plants and varieties, but the firm managed to overcome these   65
bureaucratic barriers as a result of lessons learned in the previous attempt to import chestnut 
seedlings.   
 
Location and returns. There was some uncertainty regarding investment returns. While input 
prices and labor costs for harvest were relatively well known, and the choice of macro-
propragation techniques helped control costs, crop prices were more uncertain, as they vary 
depending on the date of harvest and the transportation method used. Initial contacts with UK 
importers gave Vergel some information on these issues, but final returns were not revealed until 
Vergel experimented with production. 
In a first stage Caffarena planted two hectares that he owned in Zárate, in northern 
Buenos Aires, without knowing if this was the best location for production. This experiment 
failed, as many plants died, but it revealed crucial information on the best production location 
and on the actual prices that he could obtain. This location allowed Vergel to harvest in October, 
one month ahead of the harvest in Chile, its main potential competitor in the off-season. The 
Northern Hemisphere price for this month was around $20-40 per kilo (depending on the week), 
and Vergel faced no competition, allowing it to become a (temporary) monopolist.
12 In contrast, 
the price that Chile and New Zealand received was up to ten times smaller (see Table 4). This 
price advantage made the business profitable even if the worst possible production techniques 
were used (Chilean prices did not permit profitability if poor production techniques were used).  
 
Table 4. Initial Off-Season FOB Prices for Blueberries, US$/Kilo 
 
Year  Argentina  Chile  New Zealand 
1994  20.11 1.29  4.22 
1995  22.11 1.91  5.11 
 
Source: IERAL from Fundación Mediterránea based on COMTRADE. 
 
The pioneer was not aware at the beginning that he would be able to reach the Northern 
markets in the prime months of the off-season. However prices were high enough that the 
business would be profitable even if he did not harvest before Chilean producers, provided that 
the right production techniques and plant varieties were used. When undertaking its preliminary 
                                                 
12  The information on this price range was provided by Caffarena and verified by comparing the volume and value 
of blueberries exports from Argentina during those years that were obtained from COMTRADE.   66
project evaluation, Vergel was looking at the whole set of possible prices and comparing them 
with the expected cost. Of crucial importance was that Vergel’s per-hectare production costs 
were only US$40,000, compared to $80,000 in Chile, despite more extensive Chilean experience 
in berry production.   
Having discovered the robustness of the profitability of this business in Argentina, 
Caffarena decided to expand production and to integrate the nursery business, which gave him 
the opportunity to generate a separate line of business. After this initial learning, Vergel invested 
in a five-hectare farm, propagating its own plants with local technical assistance. The first 
harvest was exported in 1994 to the United Kingdom, and this experimental shipment was so 
small that Caffarena transported it in his own car to the international airport for export.   
This second plot in Entre Ríos, north of Buenos Aires, allowed Caffarena to experiment 
with locations and varieties in different latitudes and climates. This kind of information was so 
important that imitators followed him closely in these new locations, sometimes even locating in 
nearby fields.   
One key issue for the project was to forecast future competition, since investment in 
plantings of blueberries should be evaluated over a 15 to 20-year period (a plant’s yield reaches 
its potential only after eight years). Newcomers could lower Vergel’s prices in this period, as 
they faced a downward-sloping demand in the prime months of the off-season. The pioneer’s 
expectation, however, was that diffusion would be greater at the production stage and that he 
would be able to keep a relevant market share in nursery and commercialization activities that 
would compensate for this price effect. In any case, Vergel was at least two years ahead of any 
other competitor, which allowed it to break even and enjoy several years of monopoly. An ex-
post calculation using 1994-2005 actual prices showed an internal rate of return of more than 60 
percent at the onset of this activity (see Figure 7), suggesting that uncertainty over future prices 
mattered less than technological uncertainty. The internal rate of return (IRR) in 2005 was 25 
percent, with a price that had gone down to US$15-20 per kilo (from the initial US$20-40) and 
with forecasts of lower prices in the future. More recent evidence shows that this profitability 
may have declined significantly for the newest plantings in 2006.  
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Source: IERAL from Fundación Mediterránea. 
 
Furthermore, besides its initial monopoly power, Vergel could be more profitable than its 
competitors due to its long learning period and vertical integration. Growing international 
demand and the opening of new markets were also expected to sustain Vergel’s profitability.  
 
Commercialization. Commercialization was not a relevant barrier or uncertainty during these 
first steps, as Vergel was the only supplier from Argentina and had sufficient commercialization 
contacts in Europe. As such, it was able to start exporting a modest volume of good quality 
production without any concern for commercialization strategies.  
 
7.2.3 Were There Any Coordination Externalities at the Discovery Stage? How Were They 
Resolved? 
 
The pioneer faced potential coordination failures, which he prevented through small-scale 
vertical integration at all stages: nursery, production and commercialization. This was possible 
because of the relatively low required investment at each stage, which was within his financial 
reach; the managerial requirements were also within his scope. This small-scale approach was 
facilitated by Vergel’s obtaining access to a niche market where it was the only supplier.  
 
7.2.4 What Impact (Actual and Potential) Did the New Exports Have on the Pioneer and on the 
Sector (Knowledge and Other Spillovers)?  
 
The pioneer’s investment generated a large knowledge externality regarding production 
techniques and profits. This signaling aspect was more important when Vergel exported 
significant amounts and when production obtained good results. It also showed the most   68
convenient production location and solved coordination failures that accelerated the emergence 
of the sector, providing basic technological assistance and commercial certainty to new farmers. 
 
Public goods. At a later stage, when diffusion was already more widespread, Vergel provided a 
key public good by opening the US market and by investing in the development and approval of 
the infrastructure that was required to meet the phytosanitary standards imposed in this market. 
Since at the beginning of the 1990s there was no protocol for blueberry exports from 
Argentina to the United States, Caffarena started negotiations to develop such a protocol. After 
two years of bureaucratic procedures a blueberry export protocol was approved, which required 
post-harvest fumigation with methyl bromide (to prevent the spread of Mediterranean fruit fly) 
before Argentinean blueberries could enter the United States. This protocol at first allowed only 
exports through one airport in New York, where the fruit was fumigated. This sizably increased 
costs and complicated logistics.  
For this reason another alternative was explored, which demanded building up and 
approving a new fumigation infrastructure in Argentina. The USDA requirements were strict and 
demanded the construction of a fumigation chamber with the newest technology, not yet 
developed in Argentina, which required the use of specific software. Vergel invested $200,000 in 
the development of this chamber without knowing if it was going to be finally approved by the 
USDA. It was a risky sunk cost because its profitability depended on the evaluation and approval 
of both the USDA and Chilean experts, while benefits could be eroded if competition appeared 
and used the same approved fumigation technology. Fortunately for Vergel, this chamber was 
approved after one year of operation.   
Most exporters now use this technology, and many similar chambers have been 
constructed. Vergel undertook this risky investment because at that time competition was not that 
widespread and the US market was very large and rich. Hence he expected to enjoy high prices 
and large sales for a time span that was long enough to recoup the investment. While the 
approval of the fumigation technology was a public good, the physical infrastructure developed 
by Vergel was a private good, which helped it sell a new service to its clients. It expected that 
this new service would consolidate and eventually help it enlarge its farm client base. 
The importance of this openness can be appraised when considering that the US market 
currently represents 60 percent of total exports.   69
 
7.2.5 WasThere Diffusion of This Export Activity? What Were the Key Drivers of This Diffusion 
(or Lack Thereof)? 
 
Diffusion occurred in three stages. The first, which took place at the production level from 1994 
to 1998, was promoted by the pioneer, was limited in scope and was concentrated mainly in 
northern Buenos Aires. During the second stage (from 1998 to 2002), diffusion took place at the 
production, nursery and commercialization levels, and clusters of producers emerged in several 
locations. Lastly, since 2002 there has been a boom in blueberry planting promoted both by the 
2002 devaluation and by the opening of the US market by the pioneer (sees Figure 8).  
 

























































Source: Authors’ estimation based on production quantities. 
 
First wave: Limited diffusion (1994-1998). After his initial success under limited vertical 
integration, Caffarena’s next natural step should have been to expand the three activities to the 
monopoly optimum. However, he faced financial and managerial scope constraints on doing so. 
The investment required to prevent newcomers from entering was beyond his possibilities, and 
was highly risky, given that continuous experimentation (in varieties, locations, etc) was still 
essential. He hence concentrated on the nursery and commercialization aspects of the business 
and promoted a limited diffusion of production. His choice of activities was based on the bigger 
economies of scale in the former two activities and in the fact that production was the activity 
where there remained the greatest uncertainty.  
From the pioneer’s point of view an additional hectare planted reduced his profits 
through a cut in FOB prices but increased its gains through sales in the nursery business and   70
commercialization fees. As marginal gains of an additional hectare can initially be higher than 
marginal costs, but the price effect would eventually be stronger,  limited diffusion would have 
maximized Vergel’s profits. At the same time, this bounded dissemination reduced the visibility 
of blueberries and helped to build a controlled competition, thus extending the firm’s period of 
significant market power. 
Given the lack of knowledge about blueberries production techniques, the relatively high 
initial investment (US$200,000), the relatively long time needed to reach peak production 
capacity (eight years) and the (a priori) difficulty of selling the product (only export oriented), 
any farmer would have been reluctant to initiate this activity on her own. For that reason, the 
pioneer not only sold plants but also offered technical assistance for production and secured new 
firms’ sales by signing contracts for buying future production. It also offered potential investors 
a calculation of blueberry IRR and opened its plantation for extension activities. 
Since the pioneer still had not fully mastered the technological aspects of production, this 
initial diffusion coexisted with an experimental phase in which some techniques, soils and 
varieties continued being tested. The learning process was rather slow, and many of the first 
farms and plantations failed. These initial mistakes and unsuccessful experiences significantly 
slowed down diffusion in this first stage, as shown by export data.  For example, with the right 
technology the nearly three tons exported in 1996 could have been produced on only one hectare 
planted in 1992, while at that time almost 20 hectares were planted, with a potential production 
of more than 15 tons. 
Caffarena promoted diffusion only up to a scale that was smaller than the optimal 
monopoly level. He did this because he expected that competition would emerge at the nursery 
level and hence did not want to sink too much capital into a market that could be contested in the 
near future. According to many farmers interviewed, Vergel would have had a chance to remain 
a monopolist had he provided adequate technical knowledge to newcomers so as to reduce the 
latter’s rate of failure and consolidate a long-term relationship with them. Nevertheless, the 
initiatives aimed at maintaining some type of monopoly would have been fruitless in any case, 
since all three stages of the value chain are highly competitive in other countries.  
 
Second stage of diffusion: 1999-2001. This second stage was characterized by the entry of new 
and relatively large players at the nursery and commercialization levels, and by a continued   71
diffusion of production driven in good part by the initiatives of the new upstream players, the 
signaling effects of the pioneer’s first investments and its limited diffusion of production, and the 
pioneer’s opening of the US market. 
Two nursery firms were attracted by the potential of blueberries in Argentina at the 
beginning of the 1990s, simultaneously with Vergel’s initial investments, although none of them 
was aware of the others’ endeavors. These new nurseries had different core businesses, but both 
can be considered as pioneers the development of micro-propagation techniques, which make 
possible exponential growth in plant reproduction and ensure the provision of healthy plants.
13 
One of these firms was Cuinex, which was set up by two agronomic engineers who had 
been working with asparagus producers and wanted to promote the expansion of other related 
agricultural activities to use their installed packing capacity in the off-season. Beginning a search 
process on non-traditional crops in 1989, they evaluated blueberry production, and its promising 
payoff (given high FOB prices) convinced them to invest in this activity. In 1990 they imported 
from the United States the first plants for testing purposes, and they learned through INTA 
laboratories that these plants had several diseases, some of them specific to the blueberry plant. 
The engineers thus realized that in order to promote the diffusion of this activity they had to 
develop healthy and high-quality plants. This led them to make a major investment in a two-year 
experimentation process in which they learned micro-propagation techniques. This endeavor 
entailed investing US$200,000 in a laboratory, as well as making other large investments in 
necessary inputs and in developing the testing procedures. Overcoming large initial technological 
uncertainties, Cuinex began selling plants in 1995.  
                                                 
13  Blueberry plants can be propagated using two different techniques. The simpler of the two is macro-propagation, 
or propagation by stakes. On the other hand, micro-propagation involves in vitro processes.  During the interviews 
conducted for this project we found some controversy about both methods. Macro-propagation offers a simple and 
virtual costless means of plant reproduction, as it can be undertaken either by the farmer or at a traditional nursery; 
this method is the common worldwide. Opponents of this technique argue that: i) as new plants come from a variety 
of existing plants, some diseases can be propagated if original plants are infected; and ii) the method damages the 
original plants, which limits plant reproduction and requires the nursery to use both “good” plants and “bad” plants; 
iii) the plant grows axially, which is inconvenient for the renewal phase. On the other hand, the micro-propagation 
technique requires specialized knowledge and significant investment in development, laboratory and inputs. The 
most important characteristic of this method is that it can multiply one plant into millions in less than two years 
without damaging the original. This allows one plant (the “best” plant) to be reproduced in a controlled environment 
free of diseases. One of the critical issues is the extent to which micro-propagation leads to mutation and does not 
permit accurate certification of varieties. On the other hand, supporters of micro-propagation say that the plants are 
clones and therefore genetically identical to the original plant.    72
Direct engagement in production never entered Cuinex’s plans, as the founders expected  
production to emerge in response to high prices and that blueberry planting would boom in 1995 
and 1996. Their estimates proved to be wrong, though, as blueberry production did not diffuse 
significantly until after 1998. They attributed this slow diffusion to Vergel’s insufficient initial 
investment in learning about the most appropriate production technologies and plant varieties.  
Meanwhile the pharmaceutical firm Sidus had developed a new firm devoted to plant 
biotechnology, which in 1992 became Tecnoplant, whose core activity was the micro-
propagation of plants. Like Cuinex, Tecnoplant started investing in the nursery business ahead of 
the expected emergence of production in response to high prices. This firm focused on 
developing new early varieties that would be differentiated from the Chilean supply. 
Biotechnology techniques were adjusted and varieties were tested in different climates and soils 
over a two-year experimentation period During this period the company imported varieties and 
purchased licenses from US universities without knowing potential yields in Argentina.  
The limited diffusion promoted by Vergel forced Cuinex and Tecnoplant to be actively 
committed to this diffusion phase. For example, Tecnoplant provided project appraisal, technical 
assistance, financing of packaging plants, and commercialization contracts to farmers.  It is 
worth noting that the initial investments in R&D and laboratories operated as barriers to entry to 
micro-propagation. Hence Cuinex and Tecnoplant emerged simultaneously probably because of 
the fortuitous fact that the two firms initiated their activities the same year without knowing 
about each other. The capacity for scaling their production was evidenced in the third stage of 
diffusion, as each firm boosted its yearly sales from 100 thousand to 1.5 million plants.  
The emergence of producers during the first and second diffusion stages also attracted the 
entry of new players at the commercialization level who had core competencies in trading and 
logistics, as the product requires careful packaging, immediate cooling, cold storage throughout 
the supply chain, and air shipment for exports. Chilean exporters were the main competitors in 
this area, as Argentina’s production is complementary to Chile’s because of different harvest 
month; this allows Chilean exporters to maintain commercial contacts during the off-season.  
Some newcomers implemented strategic alliances with Chilean or American firms whose 
core was commercialization of fine fruits. For example, Tecnoplant undertook a joint venture 
with Vitalberry, a Chilean firm, in order to commercialize production, while Chilean firms SRI 
and Hortifrut began to export from Argentina in 2000. Motivated by their knowledge of exports   73
of other food products to the US or EU markets, other local firms added blueberries to their 
offerings, most often doing so by initially buying from farmers and subsequently undertaking 
production on their own.   
The boost to diffusion by Cuinex and Tecnoplant and the increased competition in 
commercialization allowed farmers to operate in a more competitive fringe in upstream and 
downstream activities; this gave them better prices, significantly reduced technological 
uncertainty, and improved plants quality and productivities. It also reduced the uncertainty that 
could have arisen if the feasibility of the project depended on only one client and supplier 
(Vergel).  
Another factor that promoted this diffusion was the drop in the opportunity cost of land 
that had been allocated to traditional fruits. Near Greater Buenos Aires there is a wide 
surrounding area devoted to producing fruit in small plantations, and during the mid-1990s some 
of these plantations had become senescent and needed to be reconverted. New owners, mainly 
corporate managers and independent professionals from the city of Buenos Aires without 
technical knowledge, were seeking new investment opportunities, and blueberry production 
appeared to be a promising activity. For instance, in 1999 Jorge Pazos, a former executive from 
an important metal mechanical exporting firm, decided to convert to another crop his seven 
hectares of peaches and plums in Mercedes, 100 kilometers west of Buenos Aires. He contacted 
Vergel for information on blueberries, visiting its plantation and receiving advice on Vergel’s 
production techniques. However, he finally decided to buy plants from Cuinex, which also 
offered specialized advice in production.  
During this phase there were interesting examples of cooperation among farmers in 
solving coordination failures which could lower their profits significantly. For instance, Pazos 
assisted a small farmers’ cooperation in improving commercialization and production techniques 
and in eventually cutting costs. Most of the members were located around the Route 41 near 
Mercedes, and had an administrative or professional background. When a packing plant was 
required the members invested jointly in its provision. The cooperative also connected with other 
producers in distant locations, which eventually led to the formation of a farmers’ association 
that provides some common services (contacting the government, promoting research, increasing 
SENASA’s commitment to the sector, etc.). This association, the CAPAB (Cámara de 
Productores de Arándanos y otros Berries) now has 600 members.    74
While in 1998 Vergel was the only significant exporter, in 2001 there were seven new 
exporters, and new producers diffused activity from Buenos Aires to other locations.  
 
Third stage of diffusion. The last and largest diffusion wave started in 2002. During this phase 
there were many nurseries that supplied different varieties of blueberry plants and propagation 
systems, and numerous farmers and exporters, which signaled the feasibility and the profitability 
of production and exports. This increase generated public goods in the form of refined 
technological knowledge, attracting additional newcomers. In addition, the 2001-2002 financial 
crisis and devaluation lured many investors who had managed to maintain large liquidity in 
foreign currency but lacked financial alternatives for investing; the devaluation also reduced 
labor costs. The fact that Cuinex and TecnoPlant/TecnoVital Nurseries offered business 
packages that included plant supply, technical assistance, commercialization and an updated 
project appraisal of blueberry plantations was especially useful in this context.  
Blueberry plantations have boomed since 2002-2003, when clusters of newcomers 
proliferated in small plantations and large firms or groups of investors started large plantations of 
200 hectares or more. New locations were discovered, including Tucumán in the north, Entre 
Ríos in the east and San Luis in the west, which helped to widen the harvest season. Tecnovital 
and Cuinex decided to integrate vertically in this stage, investing in big plantations, and those 
firms were, along with Vergel, some of the largest investors in terms of hectares planted and 
locations covered.  
The opening of the US market by the pioneer played a very important role during this 
stage. It was stated in an interview with one of the biggest players that its investment would have 
been 200 hectares—instead of 2,000—without access to the US market.  
 
Overall appraisal of diffusion. Newcomers explain 98 percent of total growth in blueberry 
exports between the early 1990s and 2005, which increased from US$1 million to US$28 million 
(see Table 5). While Vergel increased its exports by 50 percent between 1998 and 2005, its share 
of the sector declined to only 4 percent in 2005. Exports in volume increased from 300 kilograms 
to almost 2,700 tons in 2005.   75
Table 5. Blueberries, Code 081040, 
Share (percentage) 
 
Firms 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Tecnovital SA 14.21 31.89 8.73 25.82 16.67 32.78 23.36
North Bay Argentina SA 24.97 28.13 32.41 21.08 19.85
Berries del Plata SA 27.51 27.59 25.64 20.21 23.99 19.87 12.42
Blueberries SA 1.07 3.82 9.77
Vergel SA 79.32 57.45 6.85 23.33 14.93 11.05 6.98 4.13
Sri Argentina SA 10.54 8.32 9.74 6.70 3.67
Frutazul SA 1.34 1.98 1.16 1.15 1.32 1.72
Argesa Argentina exportadora SA 0.70 0.08 0.59 0.57 1.37
Hortifrut Argentina SA 0.20 0.12 0.92
Expofrut SA 6.02 3.92 1.33 1.03 0.49 0.16
Total share 79.32 99.16 73.89 99.92 99.98 97.70 93.61 77.37
Total exported (US$) 1,007,109        1,506,358        2,287,740        3,824,716        6,015,668        7,085,889        16,366,342      28,371,183       
 
Source: IERAL de Fundación Mediterránea based on Customs Agency. 
 
The diffusion process is also reflected in the surface planted, which grew from an initial 
level around 50 hectares in a few locations to 3,000 hectares distributed in numerous locations at 
present. The number of players rose from around 15 farmers at the onset to a current total of 600 
producers, and from one exporter to 22 exporters, nine of which exported more than $1,000,000 
in 2005.  
This diffusion had a clear impact on prices. While in 1994-1995 the FOB price of exports 
was US$22 per kilo (and Chile faced a price below US$2), the increase in production lowered 
the price to US$10 (see Figure 9). This average price includes production in new locations that 
command higher prices due to their early harvest season. In a more traditional zone such as 
Buenos Aires, where there has been greater diffusion, the export price has gone down more 
significantly. 
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There currently exists fear that investment in the original zones may have overshot its 
optimal level, probably because prices have remained too high for too long as a result of the 
initial plantations’ poor productivity. This view is supported by CAPAB’s recent successful 
initiative to block legislation that sought to introduce cheap credit lines for new plantations. 
Their arguments were that prices were already steadily declining and that a massive promotion of 
new plantations that would mature in seven years could lower the price even to below the break- 
even point.  
Our interviews indicate that in 2006 prices for Argentinean blueberries were already quite 
low. Profitability is no longer guaranteed and depends instead on the scale and efficiency of each 
individual producer, as well as on when each business began. It appears that for many of the 
most recent investors it will take much longer than initially expected to recoup their investments. 
Nevertheless, the price signal is still not fully functioning, and plantations keep growing at a 
steady pace. Many are being financed with trust funds. 
 
7.2.6 Role of Previously Accumulated Capabilities, Industry-Specific Public Goods and Public 
Policies 
 
There were no previously accumulated product-specific capabilities upon which this sector could 
be built. However, Argentina’s comparative advantage in agricultural activities had generated a 
set of general capabilities which could be quickly adapted to this new product’s needs. This was 
the case of nurseries devoted to traditional crops and of agronomic engineers with research and 
entrepreneurial skills that assisted producers in alternative crops. The emergence of blueberries 
also benefited from the existence of an entrepreneurial class made up of former executives of 
large firms, plus biotechnological firms with vast reaching interests and capabilities. In a later 
stage the entry of other fruit exporters (with accumulated capabilities in apples, pears, and 
lemons) gave an extra boost to this sector, while some initial required capabilities were imported, 
such as the consulting and technical assistance of foreign experts. The accumulation of the 
required product-specific capabilities was undertaken entirely by the private sector and was 
motivated by the expectation of private profits. 
These accumulated capabilities and Argentina’s comparative advantage made it possible 
to overcome the presence of some industry-specific public “bads” that unduly raised the costs of 
experimentation and that hurt the competitiveness of local production. In particular, interviewees   77
stressed the deficiencies of local institutions in comparison to those of other countries. For 
example, they underscored that SENASA (the food safety agency) has been a constant barrier to 
importing the required plants or agrochemicals, and that it has been of little help in controlling 
the Mediterranean fruit fly or in helping producers to negotiate new protocols with the USDA. 
One of the latest collective actions of CAPAB has been to make formal complaints to the 
government because SENASA has not yet authorized the use of certain fertilizers which are 
extremely important in increase productivity and which are being used elsewhere. In the case of 
INTA (the agricultural technology institute), interviewees criticized its lengthy processes, its lack 
of knowledge of this particular fruit and its limited extension activities; they also complained 
about Argentinean embassies’ lack of assistance in opening of new markets. Specific support 
programs were also criticized for different reasons. For example, we obtained evidence that the 
PREX program, a subsidy for contracting export consulting, never reimbursed funds to a 
producer who had access to its support. Even when the public sector has tried to provide 
assistance it has failed almost without exception, as illustrated by its attempt to promote 
diffusion at a late stage when there already appears to be overinvestment in the sector.  
The private sector’s current demands for public policies that support non-immiserizing 
growth in this activity focus primarily on the provision of industry specific public goods such as: 
a) support of research on developing new varieties in Patagonia, a region that would compete 
neither with present locations nor with Chilean production; b) credit support of R&D geared 
towards enhancing productivity of existing plantations; c) the development of a “cool treatment” 
protocol; d) agrochemical certification; and e) the provision of proper logistics in ports and 
airports.  
 
7.3 Welfare Analysis 
This is a case where the pioneer appears to have faced a smaller initial degree of uncertainty 
about all aspects of the business than the average player in the sector, generating a very large 
information externality. However, the lack of public policies to support the development of this 
sector, together with the presence of information and coordination externalities, led to unduly 
slow growth in this activity. Due to these externalities and to financial constraints, there was too 
little ex ante experimentation in production by the pioneer, which was much smaller than that of 
an optimal social planner.    78
While no demand-shifting effects were present, this case somehow fits into the Vettas 
(2000) framework, as the investments and exports of the pioneer and of subsequent entrants 
should have updated beliefs about the market saturation point. In this case, however, there was a 
gap between the respective growth levels of investment and exports because of the poor 
productivity of the initial plantations, caused by the pioneer’s sub-optimal investment in 
experimentation. Demand revelation externalities may have failed here, as exports remained 
much more subdued than plantings for too long, leading to a diffusion of production beyond the 
market saturation point.  
The pioneer’s investment in solving coordination failures was also sub-optimal because 
of his aim to reach the monopoly optimum, which also contributed to overly slow diffusion. 
Government intervention via subsidization, direct provision of industry-specific public goods 
(hereafter ISPG) or coordination of private investments would have been called for. 
This discovery appears to offer a positive social return, as it is based on the exploitation 
of an untapped natural comparative advantage and allows exploiting a monopoly position and 
capturing positive rents in foreign markets. These new exports also involved a large diffusion 
process that was widespread across different geographic areas and that involved the creation and 
accumulation of an important stock of new export capabilities at an industry level.  
When looking at the Hausmann and Klinger product space we observe that blueberries 
are located in an area that is not too dense, halfway between the densest part of the forest and its 
outer edges. Moving in the direction towards the core of the forest, exports of blueberries appear 
to share some of the capabilities required for the exports of chilled vegetables, frozen vegetables 
and vegetable juices, which offer similar levels of productivity (in the sense of Hausmann, 
Hwang and Rodrik, 2005). Indeed, there are already exporters of pear and apple juice to the US 
that are seeking to produce and export blueberry juice but have so far failed to find a local supply 
because of the high price exporters receive for fresh fruit.   
It should additionally be noted that the production of blueberry plants via micro-
propagation techniques in Argentina is closely linked to R&D in plant cloning and in new 
varieties by firms that are involved in biotechnology applied to human health, animals and 
plants. Hence blueberries, at least at the nursery stage, could become part of a dynamic 
biotechnology cluster that generates technological spillovers across different activities.   79
Finally, this new export offers significant scalability in terms of future export growth 
through the most recent plantings and through the incorporation of new regions that allow earlier 
harvests. It is estimated that in another five years export volume will increase eightfold and the 
value of exports will reach US$180 million (taking into account the decline in prices that would 
accompany this export expansion).
14  
 
7.4 Counterfactual Analysis 
15 
We can isolate the most important factors permitting the emergence of blueberries as a new 
successful export activity by analyzing the lackluster experience of fresh raspberries, which 
share several basic traits with blueberries but also differ along some important dimensions.  
We can also identify the factors that led to a sub-optimal initial investment in 
experimentation by the pioneer and to a slow initial diffusion by contrasting the emergences of 
this sector in Argentina and in Chile, which differ in terms of previously accumulated 
capabilities, the provision of ISPG and the government’s promotion of discovery and diffusion. 
 
7.4.1 Fresh Raspberries in Argentina 
Raspberries are not a new product in Argentina, as they have been produced since the 1970s in 
the Patagonian region. This production was traditionally commercialized in the local market, 
either fresh or processed as jam. However, in 1993 exports of fresh raspberries jumped from 
                                                 
14    These forecasts are based on the estimations of the area currently planted, and on the assumptions that 
productivity does not decline and that the sector would not face bottlenecks and would be able to implement “cold 
treatment,” among other factors. 
15    The following case description is based on both interviews and bibliographic sources. Interviews: Cuinex 
(nursery; Mercedes, Argentina): Marta Arriola; Finca el Martillo (farm; San Juan, Argentina): Enrique Meiliolli; 
Mapuhue (farm;  Necochea, Argentina): José Agustín López; Berries SA. (Production and commercialization;   
Neuquén, Argentina): Edmundo Grifoi; Vivero Humus (nursery, farm and exporter; El Bolsón, Argentina): Luis 
González; Hortifrut (commercialization; Chile): Carlos Vial; Tecnoplant/Tecnovital (nursery, production and 
commercialization): Federico Bayá, Manager, and Federico Bonsini, Operational Chief; INTA (Esquel, Argentina):  
Agr. Eng. Raúl Copa and  Agr. Eng. Esteban Guitart; INTA (El Bolsón, Argentina): Agr. Eng. Eduardo Martínez. 
Bibliographical sources: INTA (Estación Experimental Agropecuaria Balcarce): “La Frambuesa,” July 2002;  INTA 
(Estación Experimental Agroforestal Esquel): “Evaluación de variedades de frambuesas,”August 2003;. Ministerio 
de Economía y Producción (Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería y Alimentos, Alimentos Argentinos,Cadena 
Alimentaria):  “Frambuesa;” Universidad Nacional de Cuyo: “Frutas finas,” 2004; Universidad Católica de Chile,  
Facultad de Agronomía e Ingeniería Forestal, José Ruiz-Tagle, “Análisis de mercado y Rentabilidad de la 
frambuesa,” June 2003; Chilealimentos, Cristian Stewart L., “Visión general de los Berries Congelados;” La Voz del 
Pueblo (newspaper): “Fiesta de la frambuesa;” Clarín (newspaper): “Agronegocios: Producción y comercialización 
de frambuesas y otros berries,” September 2004; Diario de Cuyo (newspaper): “El cultivo de frambuesas crece en 
Argentina;” Chacra  (sectoral magazine): “Breve panorama del Mercado de la frambuesa,” December 2003;   
Agrobit.com.   80
negligible amounts to almost US$350,000. Nevertheless, these exports went down to 
insignificant levels in the years that followed (see Figure 10).  
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Source: IERAL of Fundación Mediterránea based on COMTRADE. 
 
The production of these berries is traditional in the South and expanded northward to 
Buenos Aires and Santa Fe around 1989. Plantations in those areas boomed in 1993 but were 
limited in size from 1/2 to 5 hectares. This boom was driven by growing world demand and the 
perception that it was feasible for Argentina to become a competitive supplier of the Northern 
Hemisphere in the off-season. There was not an identifiable first mover, as local raspberry 
farmers’ attempt to export fresh production was based on successful Chilean exports and on 
information gathered from specialized publications. 
The initial experimentation quickly revealed the following insurmountable hurdles for 
discovering these new exports in Argentina: lack of comparative advantage and poor timing, low 
profits caused by low prices and high logistics costs, very large coordination externalities and 
lack of public support. We next consider each of these hurdles. 
 
Lack of comparative advantage and poor timing. Unlike the case of blueberries, Argentina has to 
compete with Chile, which has extended its production season from October to May. 
(Argentina’s harvest season goes from December to March.) In addition, recent competition from 
producers in Mexico and Spain has lowered prices in the crucial months of October and May, 
which is negatively affecting Chilean exports.   81
The raspberries sector in Chile expanded in the 1980s, with large plantations of about 50 
hectares, which validated government-coordinated infrastructure investment in cooling facilities.  
Exporters commercialize jointly and also share a packing plant near their farms, which generates 
important scale economies. But the key advantage is that Chile entered the market first, when 
prices were higher, allowing it to finance logistics costs and experimentation phases. Argentina’s 
“late” attempt to export at an initial low scale, with high unit costs of logistics and 
commercialization, was not profitable. 
 
Low export profits. Exports had to compete with strong domestic demand for frozen raspberries. 
During the early 1990s the local market demanded more raspberries than local production 
capacity, leading to yearly imports of 260 tons of frozen raspberries.  
Local prices of fresh raspberries are around AR$12/kg (US$4), while export prices (in 
Chile) vary from US$1.75/kg to US$4.5/kg, and exports from Argentina have a price of around 
US$4. In fact, Argentina had been importing an important proportion of its consumption from 
Chile. Apart from the relatively low profits, exporting also entailed significant risks in logistics 
and commercialization. The devaluation of 2002 promoted a production of raspberries that was 
oriented to import substitution rather than to exports. The competition with the domestic market 
is also reflected in the fact that the most popular and widely distributed variety in Argentina 
(Autumn Bliss) does not have the required consistency for export.  
Profits were significantly higher for blueberries, which have a yield of 8-10 tons per 
hectare and currently fetch a minimum FOB price of US$8/kg FOB (compared to US$20 when 
production began). Raspberries have a (riskier) yield of 5-10 tons per hectare and a FOB price of 
US$4/kg. Additionally, raspberry costs of harvest are almost three times those of blueberries. 
Low initial yields were inconvenient for blueberries but did not jeopardize their profitability. 
Similar problems with raspberries, however, meant definite failure for several farmers.   
 
High perishability and logistics costs. High perishability significantly increases the costs of 
logistics, and the post-harvest period for commercialization of raspberries is particularly short. 
While blueberries can be consumed up to 30 days after harvest, raspberries must be consumed 
within three to six days. This means that the latter must be shipped to their export destination in 
only one day, which requires excellent logistics and commercialization procedures. The process 
includes delicate harvesting by hand (with 15-25 workers per hectare), immediate cooling and   82
packing (including fumigation), transportation by truck to the international airport, and by air to 
the Northern Hemisphere for immediate distribution. Unfortunately, producers never reached the 
necessary level of logistical coordination in ground and air transport. The product’s perishability 
also prevented potential exporters producers from growing raspberries in the optimal soils and 
climates of areas such Patagonia, which are far from international airports. Finally, perishability 
disallowed exports to the US, as the fumigation required to eliminate the Mediterranean fruit fly 
would ripen the plant before it could reach its foreign consumption market.  
 
Large coordination externalities. A farm has to target several markets, given that fruit quality 
varies (only around 35 percent goes to the fresh market, while the rest has to be frozen or 
processed). One hectare during harvest season produces approximately 100 kg per day. Hence in 
order to export a relevant quantity (e.g., 1,000 kg) that covers the fixed costs of logistics and 
commercialization, at least 30 hectares planted are required. Thus all new farmers (which were 
exploiting small farms of 1 or 2 hectares) should have been in strict coordination. This 
coordination in production appears to have fleetingly occurred in 1993, but it lapsed as exports 
proved unprofitable and the commercialization channel did not emerge instantaneously. The 
difference between blueberries and raspberries in terms of production coordination requirements 
is quite remarkable. Blueberries require planting ½ hectare to obtain 1 ton of exportable fresh 
fruit, while raspberries require 30 hectares. This difference arises because raspberries must be 
shipped every day, while blueberries can be stored for several days. 
 
Lack of public support. Public policies and institutions did not offer any support. For example, 
INTA’s research activity and extension assistance lagged behind private investment. 
Additionally, logistics and infrastructure for exporting fresh fruit were not adequately facilitated, 
particularly for handling fruit in airports. Nevertheless, given the revealed lack of profitability it 
is hard to argue that support policies should have been in place for this sector.  
 
Lessons for the success of blueberries. It could appear that raspberries would have stood a 
chance of success if the large coordination problems had been solved. However, our analysis 
reveals that, even if coordination had been achieved, the combination of low export prices 
(stemming from late entry into the export market), competition with the domestic market, high 
costs of harvest, and high perishability, together with the Mediterranean fruit fly and poor   83
transportation logistics for the best planting areas (Patagonia) would have doomed this 
experiment from the onset. 
The comparison with blueberries reveals that the key reason why the latter succeeded was 
its unique comparative advantage: geographical advantages allowed Argentina to export 
blueberries to the  Northern Hemisphere during a time of year when there was no competition 
from other Southern Hemisphere producers, thus obtaining very large profits. This advantage and 
the lower perishability of blueberries allowed Argentinean producers to overcome other 
obstacles involving knowledge and coordination externalities and lack of public support. 
 
7.4.2 Blueberries in Chile 
The comparison with Chile (see Agosín and Bravo-Ortega, 2007) confirms that the lack of 
government involvement in facilitating experimentation, compensating for knowledge and 
coordination externalities, and promoting the accumulation of industry-specific capabilities and 
public goods led to a sub-optimal investment by the pioneer and to slow initial diffusion, which 
may have led to current overinvestment. 
The discovery and diffusion of blueberries in Chile was promoted by Fundación Chile, 
which participated in Berries La Unión, a public-private joint venture that engaged in socially 
optimal experimentation. This endeavor built upon the government program to develop the berry 
sector in this country. This program had generated an important cluster of producers and 
exporters of other berries and local agronomic experts and nurseries with berry-specific 
knowledge that was adjusted to Chilean conditions, and which were ready to take advantage of 
the technological and price information (harvest period) revealed by Berries La Unión. This was 
very important because Chilean blueberry exporters faced significantly lower world prices from 
the onset than the Argentine pioneer, as well as higher production costs.  Hence their investment 
in this new activity could not afford to face the same period of experimentation with high failure 
rates endured by the Argentine pioneer and the first newcomers in production.  
Additionally, and in contrast with Argentina, Chile was free of the Mediterranean fruit 
fly, and the investments of blueberry exporters were always of a relatively large magnitude, 
consistent with their access to the US market. This access was also facilitated by the Chilean 
trade negotiations with the US, whereas in Argentina this access had to be negotiated by the 
pioneer at a late stage, which greatly slowed diffusion.   84
 
8.  Development Implications 
Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2005) show that increasing the sophistication of a country’s 
exports contributes significantly to economic growth and argue that this increase in 
sophistication requires that entrepreneurs invest in the discovery and diffusion of new export 
activities that provide information and coordination externalities. Hence the most important 
development implication is what the new exports analyzed here tell us about the drivers of 
discovery in Argentina and the social returns to investment and their appropriability.  
The discoveries analyzed here are associated with pioneers that manage to capture 
(temporary or permanent) monopoly rents to compensate for the knowledge externality through 
the introduction of barriers to entry and that have the scale to self-provide the required ISPG. We 
did not find any case where there was government support or intervention in the discovery and 
diffusion processes. In the case (blueberries) where the pioneer could not introduce barriers to 
entry, there was sub-optimal investment in discovery but diffusion eventually emerged, albeit 
more slowly and with lower productivity than was socially optimal. In the other two cases, where 
the pioneer could introduce more prolonged barriers to entry, investment in discovery was not 
sub-optimal. 
This suggests that, if these cases are representative of new exports in Argentina, 
discovery may be failing to occur in more atomized activities where the pioneer may not enjoy 
temporary monopoly power, because of the lack of subsidization of discovery or because of 
inability to coordinate the provision of ISPG. This tells us that there may thus be low 
appropriability of the social returns to investment in self-discovery, which is detrimental to 
development in Argentina.  
The fact that some new exports have succeeded despite the absence of government 
intervention suggests that there are profitable opportunities which, when exploited, lead to 
learning about new opportunities, thus sustaining investment. It also suggests that, given the 
availability of good opportunities (with a vast range of accumulated capabilities in different 
sectors arising from import substitution, university education, more traditional exports, etc.), 
policies and public investments that promote discovery and that facilitate experimentation could 
have a major impact on development.   85
The cases analyzed here also reveal interesting information about the roles of 
accumulated capabilities and their implications for development. For instance, biotechnology 
applied to human health (a highly sophisticated activity) could emerge only because Argentina 
had accumulated a relatively large stock of researchers in the area of life sciences that were 
conducting basic research in public universities and research agencies, and which could be re-
oriented towards commercially oriented R&D in BHH. This is a case of large payoffs to public 
investment in basic science that could not be foreseen when this investment decision was made. 
This discovery was also made possible by the presence of large national pharmaceutical 
laboratories, which previously had not conducted any research but had the resources and the 
need to invest in these new activities—and which also could identify the most interesting niches 
in BHH for a country like Argentina. This was an unexpected payoff from having a regulatory 
framework that facilitated the existence and operation of these laboratories. This activity also 
leads to the accumulation of capabilities (in the form of general learning about R&D in BHH) 
that facilitate targeting more sophisticated BHH products and richer markets, and also possibly 
discovering new exports in other sophisticated related activities such as organic chemicals and 
other pharmaceutical products. BHH additionally generated technological spillovers that led to 
the creation of a dynamic cluster of BHH firms of different sizes, and to an accumulation of 
industry-specific knowledge that is likely to deepen over time as local BHH firms accumulate 
greater R&D capabilities and as more sector-specific human capital is accumulated. 
The case of blueberries was based on the accumulation of general agronomic skills that 
Argentina had, which could be adjusted to the new product-specific needs after adequate 
training, acquisition of foreign production knowledge and local experimentation. It also 
benefited from having access to a sophisticated entrepreneurial class that was actively seeking 
new niche agricultural activities. This case displays an increased accumulation of skills and 
capabilities (in production, logistics and commercialization) for precision agriculture activities in 
general, which may be useful for jumping to new agricultural activities of higher sophistication 
and value (such as exporting chilled vegetables and fruits, new fruit juices, or finding new 
niches). This case also offers the possibility of accumulating increased R&D capabilities in 
biotechnology applied to plants, which may have cross-sector externalities, as much of this R&D 
is being performed by firms that are involved in biotechnology applied to human capital and to   86
animals as well. The accumulation of capabilities in this case occurred at a widely diffused 
industry level.   
The case of chocolate confections is interesting in that there is a reversal of a revealed 
comparative disadvantage. This is an industry which at a world level is dominated by a few 
vertically integrated firms from rich countries that also have a large degree of monopoly power 
in their home countries via brand, technological and scale barriers to entry. Hence it is 
remarkable that a firm from a developing country could become an active worldwide exporter, 
overcoming others’ barriers to entry and introducing barriers to entry of its own. The industrial 
organization of this good’s market required the accumulation of capabilities and diffusion of 
production to occur at an intra-firm level. These capabilities could result in future exports of 
original new chocolate and sugar confections developed through R&D activities, which compete 
in rich country markets. Chocolate confections are in the periphery of the densest part of HK’s 
product space and hence could facilitate further structural transformation towards more 
sophisticated exports. 
Our case studies provide interesting insights on the links between diffusion and 
contribution to development by the new exports. A common view is that the contribution to 
development will increase in proportion to diffusion. The validity of this view, however, will be 
conditioned by factors such as the industrial organization of new goods markets (ability to 
compete in oligopolistic markets), the roles of financial resource constraints, and the ability to 
overcome coordination failures through collective action. In the case of chocolate confections, 
greater diffusion would probably result in duplicated sunk costs and a split of foreign demand by 
local exporters, leading to a possible immiserizing growth. In the case of BHH there is a trade-
off between scale and variety that sets a ceiling (not yet reached) on the optimal level of 
diffusion. 
The initial investments made by the pioneer to solve the involved uncertainties and 
coordination failures were relatively large in the cases of chocolate confections and BHH and 
relatively small in the cases of blueberries. These differences in the required initial investments 
are naturally going to lead to different market structures in the newly discovered activities, as the 
former two required the presence of relatively large firms with access to internal financing. 
Hence when we look at which activities should be promoted we should look at their   87
sophistication and the expected accumulation of capabilities for subsequent discoveries, 
regardless of whether this accumulation occurs at a firm or industry level.  
The case of chocolate confections is also typical of many activities in a semi-
industrialized economy like Argentina in that the most important uncertainty will usually be 
related to foreign demand and commercialization strategies rather than to local costs or the 
ability to produce the good. In this sense, a good development strategy should include policies 
and initiatives geared towards supporting the acquisition of foreign commercialization 
capabilities, especially in those activities populated mostly by SMEs. 
An important feature of demand and commercialization uncertainties is that their 
resolutions may generate cross-border externalities (as in the case of chocolate confections), 
which lead to a regional or international profit-eroding diffusion rather than to a local diffusion. 
When we look at the contribution of these new activities to development we should thus define if 
we are concerned with local or regional development. If we are concern with local development, 
then these activities would probably not be the most attractive, unless local firms were able to 
introduce barriers to entry that offset the cross-border externalities or the government 
implemented strategic trade policies. 
The cases of chocolate confections and BHH also highlight that it is important to enter 
world markets at an early stage of the product cycle for new exports to succeed and to contribute 
positively to development in markets where there is some degree of vertical or horizontal 
differentiation.  It is also important to accumulate capabilities for jumping early to new products 
when international competition in the original goods markets intensifies.  
In all our case studies national firms played a key role in the process of discovery of new 
export activities, whereas local subsidiaries of multinationals were not involved in any discovery, 
although in some cases they became involved in the diffusion stage. The lack of involvement in 
discovery by foreign-owned firms is due to the fact that they are usually constrained by 
headquarters to engage only in activities that offer a positive return with as little uncertainty as 
possible. Multinationals can be active participants of the diffusion process once the new activity 
has proved to be profitable and to have bounded risks, as in the case of Chilean fruit traders in 
the blueberry sector in Argentina, or of the foreign-owned Brazilian imitators of Arcor. As such, 
foreign direct investment can contribute to the diffusion process and possibly bring spillovers in 
the form of improved commercialization and production techniques and technology transfers   88
once the activity has been discovered. However, discovery appears to require giving support to 
experimentation by domestic firms.  
A final consideration that arises from our case studies refers to how open the world 
markets are to the discovery of new sophisticated export activities from LDCs. This is the case 
for BHH, where there exist huge barriers to entry to rich country markets, and for chocolate 
confections, which face large tariff and non-tariff barriers in EU markets. More generally, new 
exports that are based on an increasing sophistication of agriculture-based goods (a natural area 
for discovery in many LDCs) face stringent protectionist measures in rich country markets, and 
the same applies to pharmaceutical and BHH goods, and possibly many exports of services. 
Additionally, while many industrial manufactures may face low tariff barriers, they still have to 
deal with growing and more opaque technical barriers to trade in rich countries. In the face of 
these protectionist measures, the scope for relying on the emergence of new and more 
sophisticated exports as a passageway to development may be constrained. 
 
9.  Policy Implications 
 
We must distinguish among policies according to the particular aspect of the emergence of new 
export activities they seek to foster or to facilitate, and to the nature of the information and 
coordination externalities involved.  
The first policy implication of our case studies is that greater government support to 
discovery appears to be needed in Argentina. In cases where the pioneer cannot secure 
permanent monopoly power there has been sub-optimal investment in experimentation and 
diffusion has taken place too slowly.  
In this vein, we find that there is ample room in Argentina to promote discovery via 
improvements in the functioning of public institutions that are involved with technical assistance 
and regulation of different activities such as SENASA (the food safety agency), INTI (the 
National Industrial Technology Institute) and INTA (the National Agricultural Technology 
Institute).  
The blueberry case raises the issue of whether the government should be involved in 
supporting pre-competitive experimentation, or if it should design and implement mechanisms 
that support discovery after the pre-competitive experimentation by the pioneer has revealed the 
new activity to have a potentially high social return but the pioneer still has not sunk significant   89
capital into production. The same applies to the solution of coordination failures, as it probably 
would not have made sense to promote coordination in nursery, production and 
commercialization before the pioneer revealed this to be a profitable activity, but it certainly 
would have been socially optimal to do so after the pre-competitive experimentation.  
Our case studies also reveal that the implementation of policies that promote diffusion 
does not always offer a positive social return, as in the case of chocolate confections. The timing 
of promoting diffusion also matters, as in the case of blueberries, which should have been 
promoted earlier and not when there was a risk of overinvestment.  
When diffusion is advisable, the best policies could entail the provision of ISPG such as 
improved technological assistance or the opening of the US market, as in the case of blueberries. 
In the case of BHH, the best policies include providing access to long term financing to R&D 
through credit channels like FONTAR. Other policies include those geared towards 
accumulating human capital in sector-specific skills, for instance by giving grants to study and 
undertake research in life sciences, by allowing public sector scientists to engage in internships 
in private BHH firms (as was recently done), and by interacting with private BHH labs in the 
defining the curriculum of the relevant fields of study. s of the involved careers. More generally, 
the cases of blueberries and BHH suggest that the government need not be involved directly in 
the provision of many ISPG, but rather that it could help by promoting the coordination among 
private agents. 
Another interesting issue is whether sector-specific capabilities and ISPGs should be 
accumulated prior to discovery. The cases analyzed here suggest that general accumulated 
capabilities were extremely important for the discoveries and that the required sector-specific 
capabilities and ISPGs could be developed afterwards. However, the direct provision of ISPGs 
by the private sector was usually smaller and slower than optimal (the exception being chocolate 
confections). Hence there is need for the public sector to become engaged in providing a quick 
response in the areas of capabilities and ISPGs. 
We also obtained important lessons regarding the links between the nature of the 
externalities involved and the desirability of policy support to the new exports. For instance, the 
cross-border externalities in the case of chocolate confections attenuate the case for the 
subsidization of discovery. Furthermore, this is an activity where a private monopolist 
undertakes the same investment that a social planner would. Instead, promoting the discovery of   90
activities where there are cross-border externalities and where the pioneer cannot introduce 
barriers to entry would call for a combination of support to discovery together with strategic 
trade policies. 
Improving market access through trade negotiations, mutual recognition agreements in 
the area of technical regulations and sanitary and phytosanitary standards, technological 
assistance to comply with technical regulations and product standards, and so on, would increase 
the attractiveness of investing in new export activities. Several of these issues were present in the 
blueberry case. 
The cases analyzed here emerged during the 1990s, when the currency was not 
depreciated. The 2002 devaluation only had a sizable impact on the production and exports of 
blueberries, partly because of reduced labor costs and partly because the devaluation attracted 
many local investors with a large liquidity in foreign currency who lacked alternative financial 
investments. Instead, in the cases of chocolate confections and BHH, which are much more 
capital intensive, the devaluation had a neutral effect. Indeed, currency appreciations in some 
cases favor discovery by lowering the costs of importing capital goods with incorporated 
technological knowledge and the costs of acquiring technical consulting services from abroad. 
Hence our case studies offer no general lesson regarding the role of devaluation on discovery and 
diffusion. At most we can conjecture that devaluation may favor the discovery of labor-intensive 
activities but may have a negative effect on the discovery of capital-intensive sectors. Indeed our 
statistical analysis shows a greater frequency of discoveries in capital-intensive industries during 
the 1990s, a period of real exchange rate appreciation. 
 
10. Conclusions of Case Study Analysis 
 
The successful new exports analyzed here reflect self-discovery of comparative advantage 
(blueberries), the exploitation of knowledge niches (BHH), and the introduction of barriers to 
riches (chocolates) which in these differentiated product markets actually were barriers to the 
poor.   
In the absence of government support for discovery, these new exports emerged because 
the pioneers could introduce permanent or dynamic barriers to entry. When they could only 
introduce temporary barriers to entry, laissez faire investment in experimentation was sub-
optimally small. These findings point to the possibility that we may see relatively little   91
investment in discovery in activities with more competitive fringes. These new exports emerged 
in sectors where there were entrepreneurs with superior international networking and business 
planning skills and/or there were larger firms that can self-provide the required ISPG and solve 
coordination failures by themselves.  
The availability of accumulated capabilities and ISPG in related activities was a key 
ingredient in all the new exports analyzed here. These accumulated capabilities and financial 
resources helped finance the new developments, reduce some of the involved uncertainties and 
focus on the projects with the greatest chances of success. This means that not all the potential 
new export activities are alike and that there may be path dependence in the choice of these 
activities. 
The pioneer’s commitment to exporting and/or assuming risks was very important. The 
pioneers were all national firms/entrepreneurs that were willing and able to take chances in risky 
investments in the discovery of new activities. This set them apart from the local branches of 
multinational corporations. The emergence of these new exports involved resolving uncertainties 
surrounding local costs, production technologies and/or foreign demand and commercialization 
strategies. Each type of uncertainty had different implications for the optimal diffusion process 
and the optimal policies. 
Success in the discovery of new activities, particularly those that involve differentiated 
goods, was facilitated when the pioneer focused on a relatively narrow range of goods and 
targeted products that already existed somewhere else so as to eliminate uncertainty regarding 
whether there is a market for these goods (in the case of BHH this strategy also eliminated 
clinical approval uncertainty). The chances of success were further enhanced when the pioneers 
focused on market segments that are not targeted by rich country competitors. 
Some of the cases analyzed here displayed demand-shifting effects (chocolates) and 
demand revelation externalities (chocolates and blueberries). In the case of chocolate 
confections, a monopolist internalized the social returns and undertook the socially optimal 
investments. In the case of blueberries, the laissez faire promotion of diffusion by the pioneer 
was sub-optimal. 
Our findings suggest that there is no unique policy recipe for promoting the emergence of 
new successful export activities, which will depend on the types of uncertainties and 
coordination failures involved and the previously accumulated capabilities. The cases analyzed   92
here reveal that the set of policies required for promoting the emergence of new export activities 
will go beyond the targeted support of catalyst firms and must be expanded to include support to 
R&D, technology adoption and foreign market cultivation. The case of BHH also offers the 
controversial possibility that laxness in IPRs leading to the emergence of national pharmaceutical 
laboratories may have facilitated investment in this new activity. An institutional and regulatory 
framework that reduces the costs of experimentation is highly recommended.  
The cases we analyze show that the new exports trigger the accumulation of new 
capabilities that may allow jumping to higher branches (more sophisticated chocolate 
confections and BHH products) or to other more sophisticated products that lie nearby in the 
product space (these cases are in the periphery of the densest part of the forest). This dynamic 
accumulation of capabilities results from the learning economies in production, 
commercialization and R&D that are intrinsic to some of these activities. In some cases it also is 
the result of a deliberate choice of activities, like biopharmaceuticals, that entail a level of 
capacity building that allows local exporters to stay one step ahead of foreign competitors. This 
is very important as for many products it is becoming increasingly difficult to capture rents in the 
initial market segments due to rising competition from other developing countries. Indeed, new 
exports of goods with horizontal or vertical product differentiation and downward-sloping 
demand are likelier to succeed when they are targeted at an early stage of the world product 
cycle. In this vein, the emergence of BHH exemplifies the payoffs of public agencies’ investment 
in research, as the resulting availability of qualified biologists was a sine qua non for being able 
to target this activity as soon as it emerged. 
We conclude by comparing our findings to the original HR model. In the HR world there 
is perfect competition and the country is a price-taker, which makes ex post specialization (large 
diffusion) a desirable outcome. In the real world, foreign demand may be inelastic, there may be 
strategic interaction among domestic and foreign firms, and there may be dynamic and scale 
economies, which limit the scope for diffusion and for extreme specialization. In some cases 
diffusion may even be welfare-worsening. What remains true is that when knowledge 
externalities are relatively large, ex-ante investment in the activities chosen by the pioneers will 
be relatively low under laissez faire. Additionally, in a world where the government does not 
implement policies that compensate pioneers for information externalities, there may be a 
preference for activities that offer bigger possibilities to capture temporary or permanent   93
monopoly rents, leading to the lack of discovery of many potentially attractive new activities in 
more competitive fringes.    94
Statistical Appendix 
 
1. Aggregate and Sectoral Export Growth 
 
Argentina’s aggregate exports have not been very dynamic during the past 25 years. From 1980 
to 2005, Argentine export growth was slightly below the rate of growth of world trade (see Table 
A1). As a result, Argentina’s share in total world exports was 0.43 percent in 1980 and 0.4 
percent in 2004. In contrast, Chile almost doubled its share of world trade during this period 
(from 0.25 percent in 1980 to 0.4 percent in 2005), whereas Brazil’s share of world trade rose 
from 1.07 percent in 1980 to 1.17 percent in 2005, following a dip to 0.91 percent in 1990.  
 











World  5.04 6.05 9.72 6.97 
Argentina  1.99 7.31 8.73 6.64 
          Source: IERAL from Fundación Mediterránea based on IFS and INDEC. 
 
Argentina’s aggregate export growth was very poor from 1980 to 1989, when it 
significantly underperformed world exports. This decade was characterized by major 
macroeconomic volatility, capital flight, very high and recurrent inflation ending in 
hyperinflation in 1989, negative per capita GDP growth, and a high but volatile real exchange 
rate. During this period the country’s share of world exports fell to 0.27 percent in 1987 (see 
Figure A1). Argentina recovered its world trade share during the 1990s, a period associated with 
macroeconomic stabilization, trade liberalization, deregulation, large capital inflows, real 
exchange rate appreciation, and fast GDP and productivity growth until 1998. Argentina’s share 
in world trade started to decline again with the devaluations in Brazil and other emerging 
countries after 1998. Despite the large devaluation of the peso in 2002, exports have failed to 
grow faster than world trade. Between 1998 and 2005 Argentina’s exports grew 52 percent, 
while world trade expanded by 60 percent and Brazil’s exports rose 119 percent (allowing it to 
jump from 0.9 percent of world exports in 1998 to 1.2 percent in 2005). 
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Source: IERAL from Fundación Mediterránea based on IFS and INDEC. 
 
The exports of manufactures of chemicals and chemical products were the most dynamic 
both for the world and for Argentina. The importance of this sector in world trade grew from 
8.44% in 1995 to 10.42% in 2004, whereas in Argentina this share grew from 5.8% of total 
Argentine’s exports in 1993-94 to 8.3% in 2003-04 (see sector 27 in Figure A2). However it was 
the Mining and Quarrying (sector C) which showed the biggest increase in its share of 
Argentina’s exports (this share rose 10.87 percentage points between 1993-94 and 2003-04).  
 










A B C 1 51 61 71 81 92 02 12 22 32 42 52 62 72 82 93 03 13 23 33 43 53 6
World exports Argentine exports
 
Source: IERAL from Fundación Mediterránea based on INDEC and IFS. 
 
Table A2 shows that relative unit export prices vis-à-vis world prices (which may proxy 
for quality) rose for 10 sectors out of 25 at the 2-digit level, suggesting mediocre quality growth.  
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Table A2. Annual Growth Rate in Prices,  2004-2003 vs. 1994-1993 for Argentina 
and 2004 vs. 1995 for World 
ISIC2d Sectors description Argentina (%) World (%)
35 Other transp. equip. 16,32 9,08
C Mining and quarrying 11,54 3,70
23 Coke, refined petr. prod. and nuclear fuel 9,01 3,98
15 Food prod. and bev. 5,54 -1,25
21 Paper and paper prod. 4,15 -4,51
A Agric., hunting and forestry 2,82 -0,26
17 Textiles 1,53 -11,42
B Fishing 0,81 0,46
20 Wood and prod. of wood and cork -0,60 -19,82
27 Basic metals -0,89 -1,21
19 Tann. and dress. of leather; manuf. of lugg. and footw. -1,50 2,23
34 Motor veh., trailers and semi-trailers -2,41 1,80
29 Mach. and equip. n.e.c. -4,05 0,26
24 Chem. and chem. prod. -4,32 1,09
26 Other non-metallic min. prod. -4,50 1,66
32 Radio, telev. and comm. equip.  -4,52 -1,51
25 Rubber and plastics prod. -4,63 -0,15
16 Tob. prod. -5,59 2,44
28 Fabr. metal prod. -5,71 -9,29
33 Med., precision and optical instr. -5,79 3,36
22 Publ., printing and repr. of recorded media -6,20 -0,90
18 Wearing app.; dressing and dyeing of fur -6,67 -2,03
30 Office, accounting and comp. mach. -7,91 -4,16
36 Furn.; manufact. n.e.c. -10,64 -1,23
31 Electr. mach. and app. n.e.c. -11,31 1,32  
Source: IERAL from Fundación Mediterránea based on INDEC and COMTRADE. 
 
Between 1993 and 2005 there has been a deepening in the revealed comparative 
advantage (positive net exports in Leamer’s commodity clusters) pattern of Argentina (see Table 
A3). Mining and Agriculture Products have improved their net external balance. In 2005 64.5% 
of overall exports were exports of products with revealed comparative advantage. Revealed 
comparative disadvantage has also deepened, especially in Machinery and in Chemical Goods, 
which respectively account for 49.8 percent and 19 percent of all imports. 
 
Table A3. Revealed Comparative Advantage, 




Raw materials -242 437
Forest products -488 -130
Tropical agriculture 267 2.162
Animal products 1.003 2.874
Cereals, etc. 5.172 12.904
Labor intensive -440 -250
Capital intensive -8 343
Machinery -7.549 -9.611
Chemical -1.751 -2.220  
Source: IERAL from Fundación Mediterránea based on COMTRADE.   97
2. New Exports 
To identify new exports we first analyze trade data at the six-digit level of the Harmonized 
System (HS), as provided by the National Institute of Statistics and Census (INDEC), for the 
period between 1993-94 and 2003-04, finding 4,198 products with positive exports in 2004. The 
choice of the period of reference reflects both the availability of data and to the need to control 
for the possible effects that unilateral trade liberalization (which occurred mostly between 1987 
and 1991) may have had on the structure of exports. For the identification of new exports we first 
imposed the condition that exports should have grown at least 300 percent between 1993-94 and 
2003-04, so as to include sectors with above average export growth (154.7 percent) and median 
export growth (263 percent). There are 1,797 sectors (42.8 percent of all export products) that 
meet this first condition. In order to concentrate only on those activities that have sufficient 
economic significance, we next imposed the requirement of an average minimum export value of 
US$10 million 2003-04 and an average maximum export value of US$1 million in 1993-94, so 
as to choose sectors pertaining only to the first decile in 2004. This criterion leaves us with only 
90 products (5 percent) out of 1,797 products previously selected. From these 90 products we 
further excluded codes 999801, 999802 and 999804.
16 As a result, we have 87 products that meet 
all our requirements.  
 
Table A4.  
A. New Exports’ Share (%) of Argentina’s Total Exports 
 
   1994-1993 
2004-
2003  Change 
New exports                0.10           20.90                   20.80      
New exports without 
fuels                0.09           13.35                   13.25      
Fuels                0.00             7.55                     7.55      
 
Note: Table includes 90 new products. 
Source: IERAL from Fundación Mediterránea based on INDEC and COMTRADE.  
 
B. New Exports Value Sales in US$ 
 
   Exported value (US$) 
  
Number of 
products  1993  2004 
New exports  90 
 
11,646,297 
    
7,377,016,530  




    
4,720,637,077  
Fuels 5 
      
309,239  
    
2,656,379,453  
Fuels / New exports 
(%)  11.11         2.66                  36.01      
 Source: IERAL from Fundación Mediterránea based on INDEC and COMTRADE. 
                                                 
16  They are exports reserved for the particular use of the contracting parties and have no significance in our analysis.   98
While representing a relatively small number of products, new exports rapidly increased 
their shares in total exports (see Tables A4A and A4B.). The emergence of new exports since the 
early 1990s has generated a dramatic structural change in the composition of Argentine external 
sales, as these new exports represent 20.9 percent of the total value exported during 2003-04 vis-
à-vis 0.1 percent in 1993-94. Nevertheless, a significant portion of these new exports are fuels, 
which in 2004 represented 7.5 percent of total exports. New exports displayed more dynamic 
behavior than overall exports and represented more than one third of overall export growth (see 
Table A5).  




Contribution to total 
exports growth 
Total 9.2     
New exports  79.76 34.4 
New exports without 
fuels  73.04 22.0 
Fuels 127.84  12.4 
 
Source: IERAL from Fundación Mediterránea based on INDEC and COMTRADE. 
 
These new Argentine exports grew significantly faster than their world counterparts, 
increasing their share of world trade in new exports from 0.11 percent in 1995 to 1.01 percent in 
2004. Their current share of world exports compares very favorably to the share of total 
Argentinean  exports in world trade (0.39%).   
To gain further understanding of the characteristics of the new exports, products are 
grouped at the two-digit level. We make the correspondences from the HS at the six-digit level to 
the International Standard Industrial classification (ISIC) at the four-digit level and aggregate it 
to a two-digit level. Applying this transformation we can work with 25 sectors; only  14 of these 
sectors include products which we consider new exports. We then construct a “new exports 
indicator” by industry as the percentage of newly exported products relative to the total number 
of goods exported in each sector.
17 Figure A3 shows the frequency of new export products in 
each sector. The sectors with the greatest presence of new exports (5 percent or more) include 
activities directly linked to the exploitation of mining resources (Mining and Quarrying), 
industries that process agricultural resources (Food and Beverages), industrial manufactures that 
process natural resources (Wood and Wood Products, Basic Metals), and Motor Vehicles (a 
relatively labor-intensive activity that got an initial boost from Mercosur). Other industries with a 
relatively large number of new exports (between 2 and 3 percent) include Paper and Paper 
Products and Chemicals. 
 
                                                 
17  For example, Sector 15 (Food and Beverages) includes 379 exported products, of which 26 are new exports. 
Therefore 6.7 percent of that sector’s products are considered new exports.   99
Figure A3. Percentage of New Exports in the Selected Sectors 
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(A) Agric., hunting and forestry
(B) Fishing
(C) Mining and quarrying
(15) Food prod. and bev.
(16) Tob. prod.
(17) Textiles
(18) Wearing app.; dressing and dyeing of fur
(19) Tann. and dress. of leather; manuf. of lugg. and footw.
(20) Wood and of prod. of wood and cork
(21) Paper and paper prod.
(22) Publ., printing and repr. of recorded media
(23) Coke, refined petr. prod. and nuclear fuel
(24) Chem. and chem. prod.
(25) Rubber and plastics prod.
(26) Other non-metallic min. prod.
(27) Basic metals
(28) Fabr. metal prod.
(29) Mach. and equip. n.e.c.
(30) Office, accounting and comp. mach.
(31) Electr. mach. and app. n.e.c.
(32) Radio, telev. and comm. equip. 
(33) Med., precision and optical instr.
(34) Motor veh., trailers and semi-trailers
(35) Other transp. equip.
(36) Furn.; manufact. n.e.c.
 
Source: IERAL from Fundación Mediterránea based on INDEC. 
 
On the other hand, there were very few or no newly exported products in “modern” 
activities such as Medical, Precision and Optical Instruments, Electronics, Electrical Machinery, 
and Computing Equipment. The concentration of new exports in activities linked to natural 
resources is consistent with the previously described gain in share of these sectors in total 
Argentinean exports.  
Figure A4 displays the contribution of new exports to each sector’s export growth.
18 It is 
interesting to highlight that new exports represented more than 50 percent of sectoral export 
growth in five out of 13 sectors: Textiles (261 percent), Wood and Wood Products (78 percent), 
Mining and Quarrying (67 percent), Base Metals (62 percent) and Medical and Precision 
Instruments (83 percent). In 10 of the 13 sectors new exports accounted for 20 percent or more of 
export growth. This means that new exports have been a driving force in most industries, even in 
those where there were relatively few newly exported products. Most sectors experienced 
substantial intra-sectoral changes in the composition of their exports. For instance, the relatively 
small number of new exports (1.1 percent) within the Medical, Precision and Optical Instruments 
                                                 
18  We excluded Sector 17 (Manufacture of Textiles) because it registers a contribution of 261 percent and goes out 
of scale (while total sectoral exports grew just 3 percent, new sectoral exports rose from 0 in 1993-94 to US$42 
million in 2003-04).    100
sector (whose exports grew at an annual 7.5 percent rate) explained more than 80 percent of the 
sector’s export growth, and a very small number of new external sales (0.5 percent) in Textiles 
contributed to the sector’s export growth of 261 percent. On the other hand, the Motor Vehicles 
sector shows a relatively large number of new exports (almost 6 percent), that explain a very 
small part (7 percent) of sectoral export growth.  
 
Figure A4. New Exports’ Contribution to Sectoral Growth 
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(C) Mining and quarrying
(15) Food prod. and bev.
(20) Wood and prod. of wood and cork; manuf. of
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(21) Paper and paper prod.
(24) Chem. and chem. prod.
(25) Rubber and plastics prod.
(26) Other non-metallic min. prod.
(27) Basic metals
(33) Med., precision and optical instr.
(34) Motor veh., trailers and semi-trailers
(35) Other transp. equip.
 
                                          Source: IERAL from Fundación Mediterránea based on INDEC. 
 
While the contribution of new exports to sectoral export growth was very significant in 
most industries, this contribution was usually greater in those sectors with a larger number of 
new exports. As a result, there was a large and positive correlation between the percentage of 
new exports in each industry and sectoral export growth (see Figure A5). 
 
Figure A5. Percentage of New Exports vs.  



































Corr. Coef.: 0.70 
 
Source: IERAL from Fundación Mediterránea based on INDEC. 
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New exports displayed declining export prices in most sectors. Table A6 shows the 
average change in export prices between 1995 and 2004 for the new exports in each sector, 
together with the frequency of new exports by sector. In the eight sectors where new exports 
were more frequent, prices either declined more than for total sectoral exports (compare to Table 
A2), or grew less. In the four sectors where discoveries were less frequent, new export prices 
tended to grow in absolute terms and/or relative to the prices of total sectoral exports (compare to 
Table A2). This suggests that discoveries occurred more frequently in activities with smaller 
scope for catching up to the world price and quality frontier. 
 
Table A6. Annual Growth Rate in Prices of New Exports, 1995-2004 
ISIC2d  Sectors description 
Argentina 
(%)  % NE 
20 
Manuf. of wood and of prod. of wood and 
cork -2.69  7.94 
15  Manuf. of food prod. and bev.  -6.84  6.86 
27  Manuf. of basic metals  -4.68  6.27 
34 
Manuf. of motor veh., trailers and semi-
trailers -1.82  5.88 
21  Manuf. of paper and paper prod.   ---  3.00 
24  Manuf. of chem. and chem. prod.  -4.39  2.63 
35  Manuf. of other transp. equip.  11.70  1.72 
A  Agric., hunting and forestry  -35.02  1.20 
33  Manuf. of med., precision and optical instr.  11.57  1.14 
25  Manuf. of rubber and plastics prod.  -2.08  0.76 
26  Manuf. of other non-metallic min. prod.  2.48  0.65 
29  Manuf. of mach. and equip. n.e.c.  5.04  0.21 
                
                Source: IERAL from Fundación Mediterránea based on INDEC and COMTRADE. 
 
Figure A6 additionally shows that a greater frequency of new exports by sector did not 
appear to contribute to significant gains in world trade shares. This is consistent with the poor 
price dynamics of new exports in the sectors where discoveries were more frequent. 
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e Corr. Coef.: 0.18 
 
                                             Source: IERAL from Fundación Mediterránea based on INDEC.   102
 
Figure A7 shows that the emergence of newly exported products has been more important 
in industries that are less labor-intensive.
19 This finding is consistent with the fact that new 
exports were relatively more important in natural resource processing activities, which tend to be 
more capital intensive. It could also reflect the fact that capital was relatively cheap vis-à-vis 
labor during the 1990s, favoring capital-intensive activities. 
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Source: IERAL from Fundación Mediterránea based on INDEC. 
 
 
Finally, new exports did not appear to represent jumps between trees within sectors with 
revealed comparative advantage, but rather jumps to new sectors without RCA, as only 28.9 
percent of new exports were in sectors with RCA in 1993 (see Table A7). New exports changed 
the pattern of RCA, as 60 percent of new exports in 2004 were then in sectors with RCA.  
 
Table A7. Percentage of New Exports in Sectors 
with Revealed Comparative advantage 
 
   1993  2004 
Quantity 28.9  60.0 
Value 25.3  77.3 
 
Source: IERAL from Fundación Mediterránea based on COMTRADE. 
 
This change is due to a modification in the pattern of revealed comparative advantage, 
where Capital Intensive Goods and Raw Material Goods changed from RCD to RCA, with 
Capital Intensive Goods representing 25.9 percent of new exports (see Table A8).  
 
                                                 
19  Labor intensity is measured as the labor/sectoral value added ratio, obtained from the 1997 Input-Output Tables.   103
Table A8. Revealed Comparative Advantage  
for Argentina of Net Exports in Leamer’s 10 Commodity Clusters and New Exports 
(in Millions of Dollars) 
 
   1993  2005  % of New 
exports  
Petroleum 833  5,157  5.6 
Raw materials  -242  437  3.3 
Forest products  -488  -130  8.9 
Tropical agriculture  267  2,162  12.2 
Animal products  1,003  2,874  5.6 
Cereals, etc.  5,172  12,904  5.6 
Labor intensive  -440  -250  5.6 
Capital intensive  -8  343  27.8 
Machinery -7,549  -9,611  7.8 
Chemical -1,751  -2,220  17.8 
 
 
Source: IERAL from Fundación Mediterránea based on COMTRADE. 
 
This means that most new exports started in sectors with revealed comparative 
disadvantage, but their sizable growth led their sectors to acquire a comparative advantage at the 
end of the period.    104
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